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ABSTRACT
DO SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS MITIGATE AUTHORITARIAN RULE?
A STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS
AND THE RESOURCE CURSE
G. Jason Smith
December 6, 2010
The famous oil baron' John Paul Getty once defined his secret to success in three
parts, "Rise early, work hard, strike oil." This recipe, however, has not lead to political
and economic success for oil-reliant, emerging market states. Rather than experiencing a
resource blessing, these states have been plagued by a resource curse. This project
introduces and tests my theory that sovereign wealth funds offer an exit to the resource
curse and pathway back to the resource blessing. This theory is based on two
observations I noticed during previous research on the subject: states with sovereign
wealth funds boost occupational specialization and government transparency. Since both
of these factors are believed to be necessary for democratization, then states with
sovereign wealth funds should be less authoritarian. My findings suggest that the
political transparency claim is true and that sovereign wealth funds do increase
occupational specialization. However, the findings also suggest that occupational
specialization is no longer a causal mechanism of the resource curse.
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CHAPTER I

SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS AND OIL
The end of World War II redefined global borders as former imperial colonies
throughout the world gained independence from Europe. In the Middle East, this period
marked a shift in the petroleum trade from colonial exploitation to self-control of natural
resources. Rather than producing oil only for the parent state, nascent governments in the
Middle East were now free to sell the state's oil on the global market to any country and
at any price it wished. Development economists theorized that the revenues generated
from the sale of natural resources would provide the capital necessary for these states to
industrialize. If early proponents of modernization theory were correct, then
industrialization would increase incomes and occupational specialization leading to the
emergence of democratic governments in the region. Clearly these predictions did not
come true. Today the Middle East is a region dominated by authoritarian regimes that
remain economically reliant on oil exports. To explain the Middle East anomaly to
modernization theory, academics developed a theory called the resource curse.
As scholars debated the origin and impact of the resource curse over the past forty
years, the fiscal management of resource-reliant states bifurcated into two types of
countries: states with sovereign wealth funds and states without sovereign wealth funds.
Traditional fiscal policy relied on commodity export taxes to fund the government, which
left the state's finances exposed to the global commodity price cycle of booms and busts.
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During the oil price spikes of the 1970s, several governments established investment
accounts with the excess revenue.
The original goal of these funds was to promote fiscal stability or save for future
government obligations. States hoped these funds would offer a buffer between the
government's finances and declining export taxes when commodity prices decreased in
the future. Over time, capital levels in these funds exceeded the amount necessary to
accomplish its original objective, so states began to use these funds to accumulate wealth
to be reinvested in the domestic economy. Today, the term sovereign wealth fund is used
to describe these funds. Sovereign wealth funds are essentially state-owned investment
vehicles funded by government revenues that seek to accumulate wealth for the state.
The purpose of this paper is to explore how these funds affect the domestic politics and
economics of the states that create and benefit from them.

RESEARCH QUESTIONS
Academics produced an enormous volume of literature over the past four decades
defining and explaining the antidemocratic effects of the resource curse and debating if
an exit to the curse exists. Michael Ross empirically tested the various causal mechanism
introduced by these scholars in 200 I. Ross concluded that the resource curse was a
reality for both oil and minerals and that deindustrialization and the rentier effect are the
causal mechanisms.

His research also suggests that the resource curse is not path

dependent, but rather the resource curse is an ingrained characteristic of resource-rich
states that can be subjugated by careful management of resource wealth (Auty, 1994;
Davis, 1995; Ross, 2001).
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The goal of my thesis is to explore the political and economic effects that
sovereign wealth funds apply on the resource curse by answering the following questions.
"Do sovereign wealth funds promote occupational specialization and political
transparency?"

And "Are states with sovereign wealth funds less authoritarian than

counterpart states without these funds?"

I hypothesize that sovereign wealth funds

promote occupational specialization and political transparency, leading to less
authoritarian regimes in the states that create these funds. That is, sovereign wealth funds
offer an exit to the antidemocratic effects of the resource curse by ingraining careful
wealth management into the state governments that create the fund.
According to Ross, the resource curse prevents democratization efforts in
resource-rich states because a complex series of economic pressures prevent
industrialization and occupational specialization from occurring. Sovereign wealth funds
are state-owned investment vehicles funded by government revenues that seek wealth
accumulation as the primary investment objective; thus, states with sovereign wealth
funds have a separate source of investment capital that bypasses the complex economic
issues that prevent the emergence of industrial and service sector employment that plague
other resource-rich states. This essentially confirms the claim made by modernization
scholars that resource-rich states get wealthy from the sale of oil without industrializing
(Mahdavy, 1970; Bruno and Sachs, 1982; Corden and Neary, 1982; Corden, 1984;
Krugman, 1987; Beblawi, 1990; Auty, 1990; Auty 1993; Auty 1994; Auty and Evans,
1994; Ross 1999; Ross 2001).
I will also argue that despite the opaque nature of sovereign wealth funds, states
that operate these funds are forced to conduct government activities more transparently
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than resource-reliant states that do not have sovereign wealth funds.

The reasoning

behind this theory is that sovereign wealth funds are increasingly investing capital in
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) member states where
the fund is subject to the same national security disclosure laws that mutual funds and
hedge funds must follow.

Since increased levels of transparency are necessary for

democratization to occur, I believe that states with sovereign wealth funds will have less
authoritarian regimes.

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
To test my theories, I compiled a pooled time-series cross-sectional dataset from
information published by: Freedom House; International Labour Organization; Polity IV
Project: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2009; Sovereign Wealth
Fund Institute; Transparency International; United Nations Educational, Social, and
Cultural Organization; World Bank, and the World Christian Encyclopedia. I performed
difference in means tests on this data to examine the central premises that sovereign
wealth

funds

promote

occupational

specialization

and

political

transparency.

Furthermore, multivariate regression analysis provides the statistical tools necessary to
estimate what effect my hypothesized explanatory variables exert on regime type while
controlling for factors associated with authoritarian and democratic regimes.
To test the first claim that sovereign wealth fund states increase occupational
specialization, I separated resource-reliant states into two groups based on whether the
state had a sovereign wealth fund or not. The difference in means test suggests that
sovereign wealth funds promote occupational specialization, but only within the service
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sector of the economy. I performed another difference in means test to determine if
resource-reliant states with sovereign wealth funds are less opaque than counterpart states
without investment funds. To determine if increased transparency does mitigate
authoritarian rule, I introduce a corruption variable into the basic regime estimation
model. The difference in means test revealed that resource-reliant states with sovereign
wealth funds are more transparent than counterpart states.
I then developed an auto-regressive integrated moving average (ARIMA)
regression model with panel corrected standard errors similar to the model Ross used to
estimate regime type. Examining parameter variability within the model will tell us if the
elevated levels of occupational specialization and political transparency generated by
sovereign wealth funds actually produces less authoritarian regimes. The ARIMA model
results confirmed my theory that political transparency mitigates the antidemocratic
effects associated with the resource curse; however, the results contradict the assertion
that occupational specialization still fosters democratization. It appears that states with
sovereign wealth funds have greater levels of occupational specialization, but
occupational specialization no longer influences regime type.

SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS AS A RESEARCH SUBJECT
History has a tendency to repeat itself and sovereign wealth funds are no
exception. Kuwait and Kiribati created the first dedicated funds in the 1950s. Oman and
the United Arab Emirates followed suit during the oil price spike that occurred between
the 1973 Arab Oil Embargo and the 1979 Iranian Revolution energy crisis. Other states
followed this trend leading to the creation of several more funds during the 1980s and
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1990s. The real tipping point for the sovereign wealth investment account concept
occurred during the commodity price spikes of the last decade when another 32 funds
were launched (Rozanov, 2005; Jens, 2007; Kirnmitt, 2008). By observing what affect
the funds created before 1990 had on the political structure of the states that created them,
we can determine if sovereign wealth funds mitigate the antidemocratic forces associated
with the resource curse in the past. If this claim is true, then sovereign wealth funds
could offer a pathway to careful wealth management capable of mitigating the
antidemocratic effects of the resource curse in states with recently established funds.

STUDY OVERVIEW
The rest of this study is divided into five chapters. Chapter two covers the
resource curse literature and the primary causal mechanisms uncovered by Ross. The
chapter starts with an overview of the resource blessing literature published by
developmental economists who hypothesized that the discovery of oil would lead to
economic and political modernization including industrialization and democratization.
The next two sections summarize the economic and political research into the resource
curse that emerged in the 1970s when it became clear that industrialization and
democratization were not occurring in the Middle East. The next section explores the
causal mechanisms identified by Ross that provide the theoretical foundation to my claim
that sovereign wealth funds promote occupational specialization that leads to less
authoritarian regimes. The various resource curse theories also provide the control
variables included in my statistical analysis.
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Chapter three covers the change in sovereign wealth fund investment objectives
that occurred over time and formally defines the term sovereign wealth fund. The
chapter concludes with the introduction of my theory concerning the democratizing
effects exerted by sovereign wealth funds. The basic premise is that sovereign wealth
funds promote occupational specialization and encourage more transparent government
finances, which lead to less authoritarian regimes. By providing citizens with the skills
necessary to lobby the government and opening the methods by which governments
finance fiscal expenditures, then the social and cultural changes necessary to foster
democratization can emerge.
Chapters four and five cover the statistical analysis I used to test my theory.
Chapter four outlines the data I use for my statistical analysis and examines the essential
premises of my theory using bivariate regression analysis. I test my hypotheses using a
pooled time-series cross-sectional database I compiled. The descriptive statistics and
bivariate regression analysis suggest that states with sovereign wealth funds are less
authoritarian than states without these funds.
Chapter five introduces my research methodology, presents the inferential
statistics, and summarizes the empirical tests performed on my theories. Results of the
statistical analyses were mixed. Support was found for the central claim that sovereign
wealth funds exert a democratizing influence, but only through increased political
transparency. The difference in means test suggests that sovereign wealth funds increase
participation for both males and females in the service sector of the economy only;
however, the regime-estimation model implies that occupational specialization is no
longer a determinant of regime type. Evidence from the political transparency difference
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in means test suggests that sovereign wealth funds are correlated with more transparent
regimes. The regime-estimation model reinforces my claim that elevated levels of
political transparency associated with sovereign wealth funds produce less authoritarian
regimes. Finally. chapter six covers the conclusion of my research and suggests several
future research questions regarding the internal effects of sovereign wealth funds.
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CHAPTER II

THE POLITICAL-ECONOMY OF THE RESOURCE CURSE
The discovery of oil in the Middle East was originally considered a resource
blessing as scholars hypothesized that the revenue generated by oil exports would usher
in an era of political and economic development throughout the region. Development
economists theorized that these states could reinvest capital generated by export taxes on
oil to expedite growth of the domestic manufacturing sector. Modernization scholars
assumed that corresponding increases in personal wealth and occupational specialization
that naturally accompany the industrialization process would generate demand by citizens
for democratic reforms. These predictions have not come to fruition; and today the
Middle East remains economically-reliant on oil exports and dominated by authoritarian
regImes.
This chapter explores the evolution of political and economic research into the
resource curse. The first section covers the resource blessing theory postulated by
development economists. This section outlines the theory that a resource-rich state could
use its commodity exports to fund economic development. The next two sections cover
the various economic and political theories that emerged as evidence mounted that the
discovery and sale of oil perpetuated authoritarian regimes and hindered industrialization.
The fourth section covers Michael Ross's empirical testing of the different resource curse
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theories, while the fifth section covers the causal factors of the resource curse identified
by Ross and introduces the possibility for states to return to a resource blessing.

RESOURCE BLESSING
Former colonies were granted independence from imperial states following World
War II. Development economists hypothesized that the colonial history of these nascent
states would create a barrier to economic development. Because colonial rule prevented
these countries from developing during the Industrial Revolution, these states lacked the
manufacturing and labor efficiency necessary to compete against industrialized states in
global markets. Decreased demand for exports from underdeveloped states would reduce
foreign direct investment leading to an economic imbalance within the inchoate state: a
surplus of labor and a shortage of investment capital. Therefore, governments had to
increase capital inflows and employment opportunities before industrialization could
occur (Viner 1952, Lewis 1955, Hirschman 1958, Spengler 1960, Baldwin 1966).
Oil and other natural resources offered an obvious solution to the capital inflow
and labor surplus problems. The rebuilding efforts in Europe increased demand for oil
and raw materials that the incipient governments could exploit to fix its economic
problems. Allowing multinational corporations to enter the resource extraction sector
would increase foreign direct investment and employment. Moreover, governments
could increase capital inflows by levying export taxes on the natural resources these
companies removed. The revenue generated from those taxes could be reinvested in the
domestic economy thereby promoting manufacturing endeavors separate. from the
resource extraction sector. Labor force efficiency would increase as the manufacturing
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sector developed eventually allowing the state to fully industrialize and compete for
exports (Viner 1952, Lewis 1955, Hirschman 1958, Spengler 1960, Baldwin 1966).

THE ECONOMICS OF THE RESOURCE CURSE
A small minority of mainly structuralist economists levied the first criticisms
against the resource blessing theory, thus laying the groundwork for future studies into
the economic effects of the resource curse. Their criticism included three objections to
the assumptions made by the development scholars. The first criticism asserted that
wealthy industrialized states would collectively use its economic power during
commodity price declines to tilt the balance of trade in its favor. As prices cycled over
time, resource exporting states would experience a downward spiral in terms of trade
(Prebisch, 1950; Singer, 1950). Economic research suggests that aggregate terms of trade
for primary commodities have declined 0.1 to 1.3 percent per annum providing support
for the argument that the degradation in terms of trade tend to inhibit economic growth
(Ross, 1999). However, research conducted by John Cuddington undermines this
conclusion in regards to oil. His study separately tested the terms of trade for twenty-six
different commodities from the time period 1900-1983 and concluded that the terms of
trade for oil remained trendless during this period (Cuddington, 1992).
The second criticism argued that gains in industrial output separate from the
commodity sector were unlikely if the process of oil and mineral extraction was
dominated by multinational corporations that expatriated profits rather than reinvesting
capital in the country (Hirschman, 1958). That argument has seldom been tested, because
the trend among resource-rich states veered towards nationalization of the commodity-
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extraction sector before enough data was available to reach a valid conclusion. In fact,
the rentier state literature assumes that authoritarian political leaders will inevitably act to
capture the enormous revenues generated by commodity exports for their own usage
(Mahdavy, 1970; Beblawi and Luciani, 1987; Karl, 1997; Vandewalle, 1998; Auty, 2001;
Jones Luong and Weinthal, 2006). Moreover, Pauline Jones Luong and Erika Weinthal's
research into the resource curse reveals that states with greater levels of private sector
involvement in the commodity sector are more likely to democratize than counterpart
states with greater state control over resources (Jones Luong and Weinthal, 2006).
The third criticism levied was that sharp cyclical price swings common to
commodity markets would make future export taxes hard to predict and increase the
monetary risk faced by foreign investors (Ragnar, 1958; Levin, 1960). Government
nationalization of the resource sector once again prevented scholars from testing this
claim; however, research into the effects oil and natural gas exports had on the
Netherlands proved that volatile monetary policy can exert negative economic influences
on resource exporting states similar to those hypothesized. The Dutch Disease model that
emerged from this research found that an increase in commodity exports often exerts
several complex economic effects that culminate in a concentration of capital and labor
resources in the commodity extraction sector. Rather than promoting industrialization
efforts, oil exports appear to cause deindustrialization that hinders economic
modernization (Bruno and Sachs, 1982; Corden and Neary, 1982; Corden, 1984;
Krugman, 1987).
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DUTCH DISEASE
Dutch Disease occurs when a state experiences a rapid increase in resource
exportation that culminates in indirect and direct deindustrialization. I Indirect
deindustrialization occurs within the labor market of the afflicted state by pushing
workers out of the manufacturing sector into the resource extraction and service sectors
(Corden and Neary, 1982; Bruno and Sachs, 1982; Corden, 1984). Increased demand for
resources by world markets boost wages in the resource-extraction sector of the
economy. Higher wages then attract skilled labor from manufacturing companies
resulting in a shift of educated personnel from the industrial sector to the resourceextraction sector (Corden and Neary, 1982; Bruno and Sachs, 1982; Corden, 1984). As
the situation continues, the state's workforce loses its comparative advantage in tradable
manufactured goods further promoting deindustrialization (Krugman, 1987). The
spending effect further impedes labor movement into the industrial sector by increasing
employment demand in the service sector as the state uses its new-found commodity
wealth to boost government expenditures on public and social services (Ross, 1999; Ross
2001). Increased demand for labor in those employment areas elevate wages and creates
an incentive for unskilled workers to enter the service sector over the industrial sector
(Krugman, 1987).
Rising incomes increase internal demand for manufactured goods and services
that leads to price escalation and domestic inflation (Bruno and Sachs, 1982; Van
Wijnbergen, 1984). Inflation combined with elevated global demand for resources
increase the real exchange rate of the state's currency resulting in direct

I

These are the most commonly used terms in the Dutch Disease literature.
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deindustrialization (Van Wijnbergen, 1984). The process of direct deindustrialization
unfolds as follows. An increase in the real exchange rate makes goods manufactured in
the resource-rich state relatively more expensive on the global market than goods
produced in countries without inflation problems. Higher exchange rates also make
imports relatively cheaper than domestic production for the resource-rich state (Bruno
and Sachs, 1982; Krugman, 1987). The resulting economic situation incentivizes the
importation of manufactured goods over domestic production for Dutch Disease afflicted
states. Over time, these circumstances erode the ability of the inflation-distressed state to
export manufactured goods leading to direct deindustrialization. The cycle continues
with each peak in commodity prices leaving resource exporting states ever more
vulnerable to deindustrialization (Corden and Neary, 1982; Bruno and Sachs, 1982;
Corden, 1984; Van Wijnbergen, 1984; Krugman, 1987; Auty, 1990; Auty, 1993; Auty,
2001).
Concentration of labor resources in the commodity extraction sector of the
economy does not produce the type of occupational specialization conducive to
democratization because of the unique nature of that industry. Specifically, technical
advances and worker productivity tend to increase slower in resource-extraction jobs than
in the traditional manufacturing sector (Ross, 1999). Limited exposure to technological
development prevents employees from developing the critical thinking skills necessary to
challenge the government because workers are not required to continue their education
beyond the initial learning process (Lipset, 1959; Inglehart, 1960; Deutsch, 1961; Ross,
1999; Ross, 2001). The slow evolution of worker productivity inherent in the resource
extraction sector tends to further hinder occupational specialization through a separate
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process (Ross, 1999). To maximize worker efficiency under the Dutch Disease
circumstances, employees are not shifted around to different jobs. As such, unions and
other industrial groups do not form to protect workers.

THE POLITICS OF THE RESOURCE CURSE
The political side of the resource curse emerged from attempts to explain why
resource-rich states did not democratize despite increasing wealth. Classical
modernization scholars hypothesized that industrialization would inevitably generate
higher incomes and occupational specialization that promote the social and cultural
changes necessary for democratization to occur in post-colonial states (Lip set, 1959;
Inglehart, 1960; Deutsch, 1961). While these scholars did not address resource wealth
directly, the implicit assumption was that rising incomes in the Middle East would have
the same effect as elsewhere (Ross 1999; Ross, 200 1). Democratization efforts did not
come to fruition during the 1960s and 1970s despite the fact that personal incomes and
per-capita GDP rose dramatically in the region; and the persistence of authoritarian
regimes challenged the theoretical relationship between wealth and democracies
established by early modernization theorists. 2
Modernization scholars, Middle Eastern experts, and developmental economists
each offered competing theories to explain the Middle Eastern anomaly to modernization
theory. According to Ronald Inglehart, "Is the linkage between development and
democracy due to wealth per se? Apparently not: if democracy automatically resulted

Israel and Turkey are the only two democracies in the Middle East today and neither
state has a significant amount of natural resources. Wealth still appeared to be a
necessary condition for democratization, but it certainly was not a sufficient condition.

2
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from simply becoming wealthy, then Kuwait and Libya would be model democracies"
(Inglehart, 1997: 163). Seymour Martin Lipset stated, "An extremely high correlation
between aspects of social structure, such as income, education, religion, on the one hand,
and democracy, on the other, is not to be anticipated even on theoretical grounds, because
to the extent that the political sub-system of the society operates autonomously, a
particular political form may persist under conditions normally adverse to the emergence
of that form" (Lipset, 1959: 70).
Many scholars pointed to the strong correlation between Islam and authoritarian
rule as the reason why Middle Eastern states did not democratize (Skocpol, 1982;
Sharabi, 1988; Lipset, 1994; Midlarsky, 1994; Waterbury and Salame, 1992; Hudson,
1995; and Barro, 1997; Ross, 1999; Ross, 2001). The reasons for this correlation, and
even the claim that Islam is the causal factor, remain open for debate. Several scholars
claim that a combination of Islam and post-colonial rule hindered the formation of
democratic rule in Muslim states (Clapham, 1985; Ayoob, 2005). By arbitrarily dividing
the territory within Africa and the Middle East with little regard to historical and tribal
history, those regions inherited socio-political issues that prevented the formation of
democratic regimes in the area (Young, 1988; Ayoob, 2005). The predicament was
further compounded by the simultaneous promises to Arabs under the Sharif-McMahon
correspondence and to the Jews in the Balfour Declaration for control of the PalestineIsraeli areas. This post-colonial malaise left newly formed states trying to discover its
identity in a region filled with Pan-Arab nationalism and regional conflict (Monroe,
1963; Ayoob, 2005).
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Other scholars argue that Muslim exceptionalism accounts for the inability of
Islamic states to democratize. Among these scholars, several theories emerged to explain
why Islam is not generally compatible with democratic governance. One theory is that
the adherence to religious dogma prevents the proper formation of political philosophy
necessary for a state to democratize (Ramazani, 1966; Hunter, 2005). Other scholars
suggest that Islam is naturally intertwined with monarchy rule (Curzon, 1892; Hunter,
2005). A third school of thought argues that Islam is not inherently authoritarian, but
rather subverts the social and cultural changes necessary for a state to democratize. This
theory rests on the assumption that civil societies separate from the government and
above the family level must emerge and unite a state's citizens before the social changes
necessary for democratization could occur (Putnam, 1993).
Middle Eastern specialists refused to accept Islam as the explanatory factor for the
failure of democratization in the region. Instead, these scholars argued that the global
economic structure inhibited democratization by creating rentier states in the Middle East
(Mahdavy, 1970; Beblawi and Luciani, 1987; Beblawi, 1990, Lam and Wantchekon,
1999). According to the economist David Ricardo, "Mines, as well as land, generally pay
rent to their owners and this rent. .. is the effect and never the cause of the high value of
their produce" (Ricardo, 1821: 590). Thus, rents are unearned benefits and rentier states
are countries economically reliant on the unearned revenues paid by the sale of natural
resources. Hazem Beblawi published four characteristics that define a rentier state. First,
the rent situation predominates. Second, the economy must rely on a substantial external
rent - and therefore does not require a strong domestic productive sector. Third, only a
small proportion of the working population is actually involved in the generation of the
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rent. Fourth, and most importantly, the state's government is the principal recipient of
the external rent (Mahdavy, 1970: 428; Beblawi and Luciani, 1987: 85).
The rentier state theory can be viewed as the ideological inverse of the American
Revolution: "There is no representation without taxation" (Beblawi, 1991: 10). Export
taxes on oil generated enough revenue that the state did not need to levy internal taxes on
its citizens to fund government operations; thus, citizens and civic institutions lacked the
will to demand democracy (Luciani, 1990). Another way to view this concept is that
citizens implicitly accept the cost of authoritarian rule in exchange for the benefit of
paying no taxes (Entelis, 1976; Beblawi, 1987; Beblawi and Luciani, 1990; Shambayati,
1994; Anderson, 1995; Vandewalle, 1998).3 Some scholars argue that governments
actually use oil export capital to fund its military and mukhabarat (internal police forces),
which are then used to stifle internal dissent and squash democratic institutions before
they could assert their presence (Moore, 1966; First, 1980; Vandewalle, 1994;
Shambayati, 1994). This addendum to the rentier state theory is commonly called the
repression effect.
A third explanation for the lack of democratization emerged based on the Dutch
Disease literature. Economists noticed a peculiar trend that emerged during the 1970s oil
price spikes. Instead of experiencing widespread economic gains, states reliant on oil
exports endured deindustrialization throughout the decade. The Dutch Disease theory
claims that rising oil revenues accelerate government spending leading to rapidly rising
inflation rates. Inflation destabilized the state's currency increasing the monetary risks
associated with foreign direct investment. The exchange rate risk was especially

3 See also Charles Tilly, Phillip T. Hoffman, and Kathryn Norberg.
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dangerous in economic sectors not affiliated with oil extraction further aggravating
industrialization efforts (Prebisch, 1950; Singer, 1950; Bruno and Sachs, 1982; Corden
and Neary, 1982; Corden, 1984; Krugman, 1987).
The Dutch Disease phenomenon was further exacerbated by increased
government spending on public services and the nationalization of oil companies. Both
of these actions increased the level of government spending relative to GDP, which
magnified the crowding-out effect for private industry (Bruno and Sachs, 1982; Corden
and Neary, 1982; Corden, 1984). By the early 1980s, the crowding-out effect and
nationalization of oil companies virtually eliminated private industry in the Middle East.
As private actors withdrew investment capital from non-energy industries, labor moved
from general manufacturing to the oil sector. Thus, states were able to develop
economically and generate wealth without industrializing (Ross, 1999; Ross, 2001).

EMPIRICAL TESTING OF THE RESOURCE CURSE
The resource curse theories were methodologically sound, but remained
qualitative in nature and had not been quantitatively t~sted (Ross, 2001). Ross fixed that
oversight by empirically testing the basic premise of the resource curse and several of the
underlying assumptions present in different existing theories. He concluded that that
resource curse claim was valid. The correlation between oil and authoritarian rule is
present and statistically significant even after accounting for the presence of Islam (Ross,
2001). Oil also hurt poorer states more than it hurt wealthier states, which means that
even a relatively small amount of oil export revenue can hurt democratization efforts in
relatively poor states (Ross, 2001). Ross also tested the regional claim and discovered
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that the resource curse does exist outside the Middle East. The results suggest that the
presence of oil hindered democratization efforts in Indonesia, Malaysia, Nigeria, Mexico,
and possibly several Central Asian states (Ross, 2001).
Concerning the various causal mechanisms, Ross found tentative support for the
rentier, repression, and modernization effects (Ross, 200 1). Ross looked at tax rate and
government spending to test the rentier theorists' claim that governments suppress
democratic pressure by bribing citizens with low tax rates and welfare spending.
Statistical testing revealed that lower corporate and personal tax rates are strongly
correlated with more authoritarian governments, but the effect was only significant in the
short run (Ross, 2001). The hypothesis that government spending dampens
democratization was statistically significant in the short and long term, though, adding
credence to the spending effect claim (Ross, 2001). Testing the repression effect
revealed a statistically robust correlation between military spending and authoritarianism
in oil-reliant states, but there was little support for the claim that these states used the
military to physically repress its citizens. Ross concluded that military spending rose
because the strategic value of oil required strong militaries for defensive efforts (Ross,
2001).
Ross tested the modernization scholars claim that deindustrialization diminished a
population's desire for democracy. He concluded that claims made by modernization
scholars were essentially valid. There is a strong correlation between deindustrialization
and authoritarian regimes; however, the results could be interpreted two ways.
Modernization theory is valid, but the only real effect is that resource wealth inhibits
occupational specialization outside of the oil sector (Ross, 2001). Another possible
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interpretation suggests that the rentier effect and modernization effect occur
simultaneously in oil-reliant states (Ross, 2001). Widespread industrialization does not
occur because there is no demand for labor outside of the oil sector; however, this
situation is not a problem for the state because the government can disperse oil wealth via
welfare spending without industrializing. Since the public never develops the cultural
skills associated with economic modernization, the system inherently dampens internal
dissent and demands for democracy (Ross, 1999; Ross, 2001).

EXITS TO THE RESOURCE CURSE
Ross concluded that the presence of oil and other natural resources exert negative
pressures on democratization, but he also determined that the resource curse was not path
dependent (Auty, 1993; Auty, 1994; Auty, 2001; Ross, 2001). He did not expound on
what an exit to the resource curse might look like, but his regression results suggest that
escape from the trap was theoretically possible (Ross, 2001). This finding contradicts
previous research that asserts the only wayan oil-rich state could exist as a democracy is
if that state was a functioning democracy at the time oil was discovered (Beblawi, 1987;
Beblawi and Luciani, 1990). Any state that was not had not fully democratized by the
time oil was discovered would remain intrinsically plagued by the poor economic growth
and weak civic institutions that perpetuate authoritarian regimes.
What options exist for an exit from the resource curse? Samuel Huntington
defined three methods for democratic transition called: transformation, transplacement,
and replacement. Transformation occurs when elites push for change. Transplacement
takes place when joint action from the government and opposition groups foster
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democratization. Replacement occurs when opposition groups act alone to overthrow the
authoritarian regime and implement a democratic government (Huntington, 1991). Given
the unique situation presented by the resource curse, transformation and replacement are
highly unlikely to occur in resource-reliant states. That leaves transplacement as the only
logical escape for the resource curse.
Jones Luong and Weinthal (2006) argue that Beblawi's fourth characteristic of
rentier states is the determinant factor for transplacement. Their approach differs from
previous research by treating the structure of the oil industry as an endogenous rather
than an exogenous variable. When the state is the primary recipient of oil revenue,
government officials inherently increase their authority over the entire oil institution from
the extraction process to revenue collection. This situation creates an incentive for the
state actors overseeing the distribution of wealth to focus solely on the short-term with
little regard for the long-term consequences of their actions. This situation ingrains
political corruption that thwarts the emergence of civic institutions. The failure to expand
civic institutions inhibits the formation of civil society, thus preventing the occurrence of
transplacement events (Jones Luong and Weinthal, 2006).
Furthermore, privatization of the resource sector in authoritarian regimes is rare
because external political pressures encourage greater state-ownership of resources
(Jones Luong and Weinthal, 2006). The Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
(OPEC) and the global political structure encourage policy convergence among resource
producing states by rewarding compliant governments with oil prices higher than freemarket equilibrium would produce. Adherence to the status quo hinders the formation of

22

political competition and alternate revenue streams thus fomenting internal constraints on
the oil institution that perpetuate authoritarian rule (Jones Luong and Weinthal, 2006).
The entrance of private actors in the oil institution mitigates the antidemocratic
effects of the resource curse through two channels. First, states that allow private
corporations to enter the oil sector create an avenue for wealth dispersion separate from
the government (Jones Luong and Weinthal, 2006). Diminished power over the
distribution of oil wealth means the state must develop revenue streams separate from oil
export taxes. If the only way to generate more government revenue is through internal
taxes, then the relationship between social welfare benefits and the cost of authoritarian
rule will shift out of equilibrium. Transformation events could theoretically emerge from
this imbalance.
The second channel offers a more direct route to transplacement. When private
owners earn a stake in the outcome of the oil sector, the oil institution offers an economic
incentive for private actors to engage the government in negotiations over resource
property rights and taxes (Jones Luong and Weinthal, 2006). According to Jones Luong
and Weinthal, "Thus, privatization to domestic actors offers an alternative path out of the
'resource curse' because it creates an incentive for both state and non-state actors to
bargain over and eventually establish the formal rules of the game" (Jones Luong and
Weinthal, 2006). Transplacement should naturally emerge under these circumstances.
Strong property rights must exist before these circumstances can promote
transplacement. Private corporations that enter states where weak property rights prevail
face an investment risk that cannot be mitigated by normal profit margins (Ross, 1999).
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However, multinational resource extraction companies can maintain operational
profitability by hiring rebels, gangs, or private militia to enforce its property rights (Ross,
1999). This situation creates a unique economic structure conducive to slow industrial
growth and a booming resource extraction sector (Chicilnsky, 1994; Ross, 1999).4
Resource export taxes surpass other forms of government revenue over time further
enhancing the antidemocratic effects of the resource curse. These effects are
compounded because states with poorly enforced property rights tend to gain a
comparative advantage over other states in export markets (Chichilnsky, 1994).

OVERVIEW
Ross settled many of the academic disputes found in the resource curse literature.
Empirical testing validates the existence of a statistically robust relationship between
economic reliance on resource exports and authoritarian regimes; thus confirming the
basic premise of the resource curse. The regression models also suggest that oil export
revenues inhibit occupational specialization and increase government spending resulting
in deindustrialization and the persistence authoritarian regimes (Ross, 2001). Strictly
speaking, these results confirm that the modernization and rentier effects are the causal
mechanisms of the resource curse. This chapter also introduced evidence that the
resource curse is not path dependent and can be overcome by careful management of the
wealth associated with resource exports (Auty, 1994; Ross, 2001; Jones Luong and
Weinthal,2006). The next chapter introduces my theory about how states might escape
from the resource curse.

4 According the Ross, the correlation between slow economic growth and resource export
dominance is spurious. Both are a result of poorly enforced property rights (Ross, 1999).
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CHAPTER III

SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS
Sheikh Abdullah AI-Salem AI-Sabah of Kuwait charted the first sovereign wealth
in 1953 (Kimmitt, 2008). The primary investment objective of the Kuwait Investment
Authority was to reduce the state's economic dependence on a single non-renewable
resource and promote domestic economic diversification. The concept was ahead of its
time, but caught on quickly during the 1970s oil price spikes. Three more national funds
were chartered between the 1973 Arab Oil Embargo and the 1979 Iranian Revolution
energy crisis: Singapore (Temasek Holdings, non-commodity), the United Arab Emirates
(Abu Dhabi Investment Authority, oil), and Oman (State General Reserve Fund, oil).5
Another four were launched in the early 1980s, bringing the total to nine funds. 6 The
idea reemerged during the spike in oil and commodity prices that started in the late 1990s

The United Arab Emirates created their flagship AIDA fund during this time. The fund
was officially chartered by Abu Dhabi; however, the fund essentially served as the United
Arab Emirates' federal fund until 2007 when the Emirates Investment Authority fund was
created. Several U.S. states and a Canadian province also have sovereign wealth funds.
Since U.S. states and Canadian provinces are not strictly sovereign, these funds are
excluded from this study.
6 The nine funds are the Kuwait Investment Authority (Kuwait), Revenue Equalization
Reserve Fund (Kiribati), Temasek Holdings (Singapore), Abu Dhabi Investment
Authority (United Arab Emirates), State General Reserve Fund (Oman), Government of
Singapore Investment Corporation (Singapore), Brunei Investment Agency (Brunei),
International Petroleum Investment Company (United Arab Emirates), and the Social and
Economic Stabilization Fund (Chile).
5
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leading to the creation of at least 32 new funds since 2000 (Jens, 2007; Kimmitt, 2008).7
Today, there are as many as 40 different funds representing 34 different states (Kimmitt,
2008).8 A list of these funds can be found in Appendix A.
Currently these funds control an estimated $2 - $3 trillion in assets, a number that
could grow by as much as $1 trillion a year for the foreseeable future (Rozanov, 2005;
Jens, 2007; Kimmitt, 2008). Furthermore, Morgan Stanley analysts estimate that
sovereign wealth funds could potentially manage as much as $12 trillion in assets by
2015 (The Economist, 2008).9 Individual funds range in size from $400 million in
Kiribati's fund to $875 billion controlled by the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority (ADIA)
Fund (Jens, 2007; Kimmitt, 2008).10 Given these facts, researchers should not ignore the
future impact sovereign wealth fund managers will apply to domestic and global
economic systems.
The first section of this chapter delineates the term sovereign wealth fund. The
U.S. Treasury Departments official definition is the most widely used and appropriate
characterization of sovereign wealth funds for this paper. The next section briefly
describes how sovereign wealth funds are capitalized. Current literature divides funds

7 Jens reported that 31 funds have been created since 2000 (Jens, 2007). Since the
publication of the article, Saudi Arabia has announced the creation of a new fund
(www.sovereignwealthinstitute.com).
8 Estimates vary based on the different definitions of sovereign wealth funds and how the
assets for non-transparent funds are estimated. The Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute,
which offers the broadest definition and counting scheme, claims that there are now 50
separate national funds that are actively managed.
9 To put this in perspective, hedge funds managers control $1.7 trillion in assets, while
pension funds and mutual funds collectively manage about $53 trillion in assets (Jens,
2007; Kimmitt, 2008).
10 Jens states that the United Arab Emirates had three separate sovereign wealth funds
(Jens,2007). Accordin'g to the Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute, the UAE now operates
at least seven separate sovereign wealth funds (www.sovereignwealthinstitute.org).
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into commodity and non-commodity funded. The third section covers the different types
of sovereign wealth funds. And the final section introduces my hypotheses about how
these funds promote democratization by cultivating occupational specialization and
political transparency.

SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS DEFINED
The idiom sovereign wealth fund was first used in 2005 by Andrew Rozanov for
an article published in the Central Banking Journal (Rozanov, 2005). Prior to 2005, the
terminology sovereign wealth management was generically used to refer to the four
different types of sovereign wealth investment vehicles: official reserve funds,
stabilization funds, public pension funds, and state-owned enterprises. The term
originated because a number of official reserve funds, stabilization funds, and public
pension funds had accumulated far more capital than was required for its original
investment objectives. The high opportunity costs of idling excess capital encouraged
many fund managers to invest accumulated wealth in less-liquid, higher growth
investments. Rozanov's article explored this trend and proposed that the new moniker
sovereign wealth funds be introduced to describe funds that had out-grown its original
mission (Rozanov, 2005).
What is a sovereign wealth fund? According to the U.S. Treasury Department,
sovereign wealth fund are defined as: "[G]overnment investment vehicles funded by
foreign exchange assets and managed separately from official reserves" (Kimmitt, 2008:
122). A sovereign wealth fund is essentially a state-owned investment account funded by
excess government revenues with the investment objective of seeking larger capital gains
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than official reserve funds (Rozanov, 2005; Jens, 2007; Kimmitt, 2008). Notably,
sovereign wealth funds are differentiated from traditional official reserve funds, public
pension funds, and stabilization funds by the investment objective of the fund.
The U.S. Treasury Department definition specifically separates sovereign wealth
funds from official reserves funds, because of the difference in investment objectives
between the two. Official reserve funds seek to protect against finance payment
imbalances and offer a buffer against exchange rate volatility. With this objective in
mind, official reserve funds typically invest in highly liquid securities that offer safer
returns (Kimmitt, 2008).11 The primary investment objective of sovereign wealth fund
managers is to seek higher returns than official reserve funds. Thus, "[Sovereign wealth
fund] managers typically have higher tolerance for risk and seek higher returns than do
official reserve managers" (Kimmitt, 2008: 127). To accomplish this objective, fund
managers typically invest in stocks, corporate bonds, real estate, and other financial
instruments or investments (Jen, 2007; Kimmitt, 2008).
Sin~e

sovereign wealth funds are officially separated from official reserve funds,

its activities are not subject to the International Monetary Fund's transparency guidelines.
Therefore, information about the exact source of capital and investment objective is not
published for most funds. 12 The lack of transparency exhibited by sovereign wealth
funds compelled numerous academic debates over potential ulterior motives given to
fund managers by state governments. This argument shifted to the political and public

Official reserve funds are typically managed by a state's monetary authority, which is
usually the state's central bank (Rozanov, 2005). Official reserve funds typically invest
in very safe, highly liquid assets such as government bonds (Jens, 2007; Kimmitt, 2008).
12 Sovereign Wealth Funds are still required to follow national security laws, including
requests for disclosure statements, requested by states where the fund invests assets.
II
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spheres following the Chinese National Offshore Oil Company's (CNOOC) attempted
buyout of Unocal and the Dubai World's Ports deal. Quarrels over how these proposed
merges would affect national security raged in Congress and on the front pages of
newspapers. The heated nature of this controversy generated a plethora of news and
academic articles debating how sovereign wealth funds affect global political structures.
As such, this subject matter has been extensively covered by academics and journalists
alike. The internal political effects of sovereign wealth funds have thus far been left out
of the literature. This is an oversight I hope to remedy in this thesis.

SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUND CAPITALIZATION

Despite the lack of transparency, there is enough information available to separate
funds into two broad categories based on general funding sources. These classifications
are commodity and non-commodity capitalized funds. Commodity funds include both
mineral and oil capitalized funds, while most non-commodity funds are created with
excess export taxes levied on manufactured goods. This classification just recently
emerged, because before 1993 Singapore owned the only non-commodity capitalized
fund. Prior to this classification, investment funds were typically called either oil or
mineral funds (Rozanov, 2005). Over the last decade 12 non-commodity funds
originated as export-oriented industrializing states followed the same path used by
resource exporters to achieve higher returns on excess currency reserves (Rozanov, 2005;
Jens, 2007; Kimmitt, 2008). There are currently 16 non-commodity funds in operation;
however, commodity capitalized funds still account for two-thirds of all sovereign wealth
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funds as of 2008 (Jens, 2007; Kimmitt, 2008). Whether or not non-commodity funds
have the same effect commodity funds remains to be seen.

THE HISTORY OF SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS
Classifying sovereign wealth funds based on investment objectives is a difficult
project for several reasons. Lack of adherence to IMF transparency guidelines means few
funds publish investment objectives or strategies. Even if the objective can be implicitly
discovered, funds occasionally shift objectives in reaction to changes in the state's
finances or global financial markets. Sorting sovereign wealth funds by investment
strategy is even more difficult. Just as every state has its own foreign policy tailored to'
the unique nuances of its circumstances, each sovereign wealth fund has a different
investment strategy customized to match the state's specific fiscal and monetary position.
Despite these setbacks, scholars identified three types of wealth management
funds based on the original investment objective: stabilization funds, public pension
funds, and state-owned enterprises (Rozanov, 1995; Jens, 2007; Kimmitt, 2008). There
are two things to remember about this taxonomy. The first thing to keep in mind is that
wealth management funds start with these objectives. As the fund matures over time,
capital levels surpass the threshold for fulfilling the original fund objective. This is the
point that wealth management funds turn into sovereign wealth funds (Rozanov, 2005;
Kimmitt, 2008).13 Second, every established sovereign wealth fund seeks higher returns
than the state's official reserve funds (Kimmitt, 2008).

13 An agreed upon naming scheme for funds based on their investment objectives has yet
to emerge in the literature. For this paper I will use the names offered by Robert Kimmitt
because these names most clearly define the fund,s objectives and appear to be the most
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STABILIZATION FUNDS

Official reserve funds and stabilization funds have the same basic objective: to
buffer a state's economy against macroeconomic volatility. 14 The difference between the
two is how they promote stability. Official reserve funds invest in foreign currencies
which the state can use to fortify monetary stability during inflationary periods.
Stabilization funds take more risks than official reserve funds, but tend to invest in safer,
more liquid assets than sovereign wealth funds. Common investments include low-risk,
income-oriented asset classes such as high-yield bonds and blue-chip stocks.
Stabilization funds first appeared between the 1973 Arab Oil Embargo and the
1979 Iranian Revolution energy crisis. It was during this period that Oman and the
United Arab Emirates followed the lead set by Kiribati and Kuwait by creating wealth
management funds. 15 The new funds differed from those established by Kuwait and
Kiribati in that the fund was originally charged with the task of promoting fiscal
stabilization rather than saving for future generations. 16
The theoretical genesis of the stabilization fund concept is the economic axiom:
"Make hay while the sun shines." According to Arrau and Claessens, "During periods of
high commodity prices - and high exports earnings - the country would accumulate

widely used terms. Funds that seek macroeconomic stability will be referred to as
stabilization funds. Funds that invest for future generations will be called public pension
funds. Funds that promote domestic industries will be referred to as sovereign wealth
enterprises.
14 These two names are commonly substituted for each other in the literature. For this
paper, official reserves are funds managed by central banks and typically do not invest in
anything other highly liquid assets that can be used to balance monetary stability.
15 This trend has apparently been repeated over the past decade. Most of the sovereign
wealth funds created during this period have fiscal stabilization listed as the primary
investment objective.
16 The funds established by Kiribati and Kuwait were originally created as public pension
funds, but both funds undertook actions to increase fiscal stability during the 1970s.
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foreign assets which it would draw down in periods of low commodity prices" (Arrau and
Claessens, 1992: 3). The fund invests excess revenues in relatively safe asset classes
during oil price booms. During the price bust section of the cycle, the government
withdraws capital from the fund to bolster the domestic economy. The end goal is to
stimulate fiscal stability throughout the commodity boom-bust cycle. 17
As the funds grew in size during the 1980s and 1990s, increasing national wealth
displaced fiscal stabilization as these funds, primary investment objective. The optimal
short-term size of a stabilization fund is less than one month's exports, while the optimal
long-term size should be much smaller (Arrau and Claessens, 1992). The opportunity
costs of idling capital in excess of this amount are too high for most states to endure for
an extended period of time. Following the Persian Gulf Crisis, the average stabilization
fund contained capital equal to about four months worth of exports; and the pace of
capital accumulation accelerated during the global stock market boom of the late 1990s
(Arrau and Claessens, 1992).

It was during this time period that the tipping point between wealth management
and sovereign wealth funds was surpassed. With opportunity costs rising and no end in
sight for sky-high commodity prices, many of the traditional wealth management funds
like stabilization funds added wealth accumulation to the fund's investment objectives
(Rozanov,2005). By the end of the 1990s, most established funds had made the full
transition from wealth management to wealth accumulation. This trend continued during
the first decade of the new century as fund asset levels and government export tax

The line between the two is further blurred because stabilization funds will
occasionally act to promote monetary stability if such actions help to promote fiscal
stability. The reverse does not hold true, though, as official reserve funds almost never
attempt fiscal stabilization.
17
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receipts rapidly increased in response to emerging market demand for commodities to
fuel industrialization efforts.
PUBLIC PENSION FUNDS
"Public pension funds are investment vehicles funded with assets set aside to meet
the government's future entitlement obligations to its citizens" (Kimmitt, 2008: 120).
Most public pension funds were initially funded by excess capital from official reserve or
stabilization funds. Public pension funds have not traditionally met the definition of
sovereign wealth funds for two reasons: public pension funds are denominated in local
currencies and these funds traditionally did not invest in foreign or riskier assets. The
line between the two blurred as public pension funds moved capital abroad to reap the
benefits offered by greater asset allocation and diversification (Kimmitt, 2008). Like
stabilization funds, many public pension funds turned into wealth accumulation funds as
its portfolio grew well beyond the capital levels necessary to fund the state's future
obligations. I8 Today, mature funds of both types seek wealth accumulation as the
primary investment objective while funding future generations and promoting fiscal
stability are now secondary goals.

STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES
As defined by Kimmitt, "State-owned enterprises (SOES) are companies over
which the state has significant control, through full, majority, or significant minority
ownership" (Kimmitt, 2008: 120). The primary objective of state-owned enterprises has
traditionally been the promotion of domestic industries, but these funds have typically

There is another implicit difference between sovereign wealth funds and public pension
funds not covered in the literature. Public pension funds have a specific goal for funding
future generations or government obligations, whereas sovereign wealth funds often have
the more nebulous goal of increasing national wealth.
18
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been allowed to invest in foreign opportunities if the state believed that investment would
achieve the desired goal of domestic development (Kimmitt, 2008). State-owned
enterprises have commonly targeted oil companies, particularly companies involved in
the extraction of oil (Mahdavi, 1970; Schaefer, 1983; Beblawi and Luciani, 1987; Karl,
1997; Vandewalle, 1998; Auty, 2001; Jones Luong and Weinthal, 2006). But these
enterprises have been chartered for other reasons too. For example, Singapore's Temasek
holding company was created to take advantage of the state's unique geographic
importance as a transshipment point.
The rentier state literature on this subject assumes that oil and mineral wealth is
always state-owned by necessity (Mahdavi, 1970; Beblawi and Luciani, 1987; Karl,
1997; Vandewalle, 1998; Auty, 2001; Jones Luong and Weinthal, 2006). Nationalization
of commodity wealth was prevalent from the 1950s to 1970s as many oil and mineral rich
states seized control of commodity extraction companies under the assumption that the
government was the only entity that possessed the enough capital resources to continue
commodity extraction (Jones Luong and Weinthal, 2006). Rather than reinvesting tax
revenues and capital generated by these ventures to promote industrialization efforts,
governments used it to nationalize all of the corporations in the resource sector via stateowned enterprises. Thus, the de-facto goal of this form of sovereign wealth management
was to give the government full control over the entire resource sector.
The research conducted by Pauline Jones Luong and Erika Weinthal give
credence to the claim that greater levels of private ownership over resources correlates
with more democracy, while greater state-control correlates with more authoritarian rule
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(Jones Luong and Weinthal, 2006).19 In other words, state-owned enterprises contribute
to the resource curse because the process of nationalization has three harmful effects on
developing states (Ross, 1999). Foreign multinational corporations insulate developing
states from export instability. After the nationalization process, this buffer disappears
leaving the governments of these states exposed to market shocks (Levin, 1960; Schaefer,
1983). Another side-effect of the nationalization process is the relaxation of fiscal

constraints that often lead to excessive borrowing for the resource-reliant governments
(Kornai, 1986). Finally, state-owned enterprises often lack access to foreign direct
investment and external technical assistance making parastatal oil corporations
notoriously inefficient and incapable of boosting productivity (Ross, 1999).
State nationalization of the commodity extraction sector operating within its
borders was the typical model for state-owned enterprises until the past decade. China
redefined the model in its search for new commodity sources. Since China does not have
particularly large oil reserves, the central government sought external oil supplies to
fulfill its rapidly growing demand. As such, China recently acquired several foreign
corporations through its own state-owned oil companies: China National Petroleum
Corporation (CNPC), Sinopec, and China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC)
(Lewis, 2007).20 The primary goal for Chinese oil corporations appears to be the
promotion of China's growing manufacturing sector. Thus, China's state-owned oil
companies appear to be one of the only state-owned enterprises that successfully achieve
the goal of promoting domestic industrialization.

19 See Chapter 2 for more details.
20 The Chinese government has not publicly disclosed its intention for these acquisitions;

however, the general consensus is that China is purchasing these companies to shore up
oil supplies for its rapidly growing manufacturing sector (Lewis, 2007; Kimmitt, 2008).

35

SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS AND THE RESOURCE CURSE
Richard Auty asserts that the resource curse is not an iron-clad law, but rather the
curse is an ingrained characteristic of resource-rich states that can be subjugated by
careful management of resource wealth (Auty, 1994; Davis, 1995).21 My theory is that
sovereign wealth funds ingrain the characteristics of careful wealth management into the
government, thus mitigating the antidemocratic effects of the resource curse. In
particular, I argue that sovereign wealth funds elevate occupational specialization and
unveil government finances promoting transparency in resource-reliant states.

OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALIZATION
Michael Ross's results can be construed two ways. The first interpretation
confirms the basic validity of modernization theory; however, occupational specialization
is the only causal mechanism (Ross, 2001). The lack of occupational specialization
hinders the emergence of social and cultural changes such as unionization, civic group
formation, and the development of oratory and critical thinking skills that modernization
scholars believe must appear before democratization efforts begin. The second
interpretation suggests that the rentier effect and modernization effect occur at the same
time in resource-rich states (Ross, 2001). The modernization effect blocks the emergence
of occupational specialization that bestows upon citizens the autonomous critical thinking
skills necessary to challenge the state's elites and demand more representation (Ross,
2001). The rentier effect further prevents the public from mobilizing politically by

21 Ross also concluded that the resource curse was not path dependant (Ross, 2001).
Auty also states that, "The mineral economies have underperformed compared with
countries of a similar size and level of economic development which lack the mineral
bonus" (Auty, 1994: 12).
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providing social benefits without collecting taxes from the population (Lipset, 1959;
Inglehart, 1960; Deutsch, 1961; Mahdavy, 1970; Beblawi, 1987; Ross, 2001).
My theory is that sovereign wealth funds promote occupational specialization via
a two-step process. The first step occurs when sovereign wealth funds break the Dutch
Disease cycle. Sovereign wealth funds accomplish this by promoting monetary and fiscal
stability. Since most sovereign wealth funds started out as stabilization funds, these
funds should remain capable of counter-acting the inflationary pressures that frequently
plague resource-reliant states. Providing an exit to the Dutch Disease cycle allows the
state's economy to develop a viable industrial sector over time.
The second step emerges after the fund adds wealth accumulation as an
investment objective. My theory is that sovereign wealth funds provide a reliable stream
of income separate from the commodity extraction sector. Rather than concentrating
wealth in state-owned enterprises, sovereign wealth funds distribute excess capital to
other sectors of the economy resulting in wide-spread industrialization. The end result is
that states with sovereign wealth funds create occupational specialization in both the nonresource industrial and service sectors of the economy. Workers then develop more
specialized skills that grant them greater bargaining power against the economic elites of
the state (Lip set, 1959; Inglehart, 1997; Ross, 1999; Ross, 2001).
POLITICAL TRANSPARENCY
This section introduces a rudimentary theory I am developing about sovereign
wealth funds and political transparency. Unfortunately the time allotted for this thesis
does not permit inclusion of a finalized version of this theory; however, I still plan to test
the basic claim that sovereign wealth funds correlate with elevated levels of political
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transparency ceteris paribus. My argument rests on the premise that sovereign wealth
funds hire non-government employees and rely on international advisors for their
investment expertise. Sovereign wealth funds are large institutional investors that require
numerous asset managers, investment analysts, and support personnel to operate, which
increases domestic awareness of the government's finances. Relying on external advisors
should increases international awareness of the state's finances.

CASE STUDY OF THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES
To illustrate how this theory operates in the real world, this section offers a brief
case study of the United Arab Emirates. Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahyan, the
founder of the United Arab Emirates, started the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority
(ADIA) as a stabilization fund in 1976 (Roy, 2006; Thornton and Reed, 2008). ADIA
was not a new endeavor, but rather an expansion and repurposing of the British colonial
investment board that was created during the 1960s (Thornton and Reed, 2008).22 ADIA
operated as a small stabilization and official reserve fund for the first ten years, but
emerged as the preeminent sovereign wealth fund over the last two decades. I believe
ADIA's status as the paramount sovereign wealth fund makes it the prime example of
how sovereign wealth funds can increase occupational specialization and political
transparency.
ADIA receives most of its external capital from the Abu Dhabi National Oil
Company (ADNOC). A continual infusion of new capital from ADNOC combined with
above-market returns on investment means the fund currently controls an estimated $600

22 The original fund was run by a British colonial officer who served as an advisor to the
Abu Dhabi royal family.
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to $875 billion in assets (Roy, 2006; Thornton and Reed, 2008). This makes ADIA the
second largest institutional investor in the world behind the Bank of Japan (Roy, 2006;
Thornton and Reed, 2008).23 With such a large portfolio, ADIA certainly includes wealth
accumulation as an investment objective. ADIA's success over this time period also
established its status as the benchmark for newly created and existing sovereign wealth
funds (Roy, 2006; Thornton and Reed, 2008).

ADIA AND POLITICAL TRANSPARENCY
Elevated levels of political transparency are a by-product of ADIA's portfolio
size, which increases access to the United Arab Emirates' finances through two channels.
The first channel appears in the operational structure of the fund itself. Managing a
portfolio worth well over half a trillion dollars requires a grandiose number of employees.
By hiring these employees, ADIA increases the number of people with access the
government's financial information. More access to the government's finances by
definition results in increased political transparency.
To understand how this works, a more detailed description of ADIA's
management structure is necessary. ADIA functions as a single investment entity
controlling one global fund. The government appoints a board of directors composed of
members of the royal family (Roy, 2006; Thornton and Reed, 2008).24 The board is
responsible for the overall performance of the fund but not the mundane daily operations.
To facilitate routine management, investments are broken down into sub-funds based on

The fund currently averages an annualized rate of return of 10% with new capital
flowing in on a monthly basis (Roy, 2006).
24 ADIA's Board of Directors is officially the supreme body with absolute control over
ADIA's offices and business. It is comprised of a Chairman, Managing Director and
other board members, all of whom are senior government officials appointed by Ruler's
Decree (Roy, 2006: Thornton and Reed, 2008).
23

39

asset classes. Internal administrators are then appointed by the board of directors to
oversee each of these sub-funds. To bolster investment expertise, 70% to 80% of fund's
assets are also supervised by external managers (Roy, 2006). ADIA employs 1,100
people internally, 70% of which are foreigners educated in Europe and North America
(Thornton and Reed, 2008). Most of the domestic managers, analysts, and support staff
were educated in Western colleges, with ADIA paying for their educational costs via
scholarships (Thornton and Reed~ 2008). As more domestic employees finish their
Western educations, ADIA hopes to reduce external manager involvement to 60% of the
fund's assets.
The second channel opened when ADIA adjusted investment strategies as the
fund's capital levels surpassed the threshold required to achieve the fund's initial
objective. ADIA shifted from an alpha-oriented to a more conservative beta-oriented
investment strategy. According to Saeed Mubarak Al Hajeri, the executive director of
the ADIA's emerging markets department, "We [ADIAJ are not speculators. We don't
like to change companies or try to take out the management. We are long-term
conservative investors" (Roy, 2006).
In 2008, ADIA shifted its passive investment allocation from 45% of its total
assets to 60% (Thornton and Reed, 2008). Passive investments refer to mutual and index
funds. Most mutual and index funds are located in North America or Europe, which
require routine security exchange filings listing major fund investors and the individual
assets owned by the fund. Essentially, these security exchange filings unveil where and
how ADIA invests 60% of its assets. The increased size of ADIA's portfolio and
movement towards more conservative holdings also make it increasingly difficult for the
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fund to keep its ownership stake in individual equities under the 4.5% threshold that
requires ADIA to file its own security exchange reports (Roy, 2006).

ADIA AND OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALIZATION
Elevated levels of transparency are not the only reason I believe sovereign wealth
funds affect regime type. I also theorize that sovereign wealth funds promote
occupational specialization through two channels. We saw in the previous section how
ADIA directly promoted occupational specialization by providing college scholarships to
employees. ADIA also increases occupational specialization indirectly by investing in
the domestic economy. To understand how this occurs, a brief explanation of the fund's
asset allocation is necessary. ADIA invests its assets as follows: 50% to 60% in equities,
20% to 25% in fixed income, 5% to 8% in real estate, 5% to 10% in private equity, and
5% to 10% in alternative investments (Roy, 2006; Thornton and Reed, 2008). Equities
and fixed income combined account for approximately 70% to 80% of the fund's total
assets. Most of the fund's equity and fixed income assets are invested outside of the
Middle East (Roy, 2006). The remaining 20% to 30% of the fund's assets are invested
domestically through real estate, private equity, and joint ventures. 25
Rather than developing an export oriented economy, the United Arab Emirates
and ADIA focus internal investments on rebranding the state as the financial, service, and
tourist capitol of the Arab world. ADIA and the government work together through a
tangled web of state-owned enterprises and public-private partnerships to achieve these
goals. An entire case study would have a difficult time untangling this web, so I will

ADIA invests very little in Middle Eastern stock markets and commodities themselves
as a hedge against the state's inherent reliance on oil exports (Roy, 2006).
25
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only focus on the three largest ventures. These ventures are the Abu Dhabi Investment
Company (ADIC), Nakheel Properties, and Emaar Properties.
The ADIC was charted by the government using capital invested by ADIA. The
Abu Dhabi Investment Authority and Abu Dhabi Investment Company officially exist as
separate entities; however, ADIA owns 97.9% of ADIC (Roy, 2006). In reality, the
ADIC essentially acts as ADIA's domestic investment branch. The company's primary
task is promotion of the financial sector, although ADIC does own some real estate and
invests in the Abu Dhabi Aviation Company.26 ADIC currently invests in the following
financial corporations: National Bank of Abu Dhabi, Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank,
Union National Bank, Al Hilal Bank, and the Abu Dhabi National Insurance Company.27
To promote tourism and real estate efforts in the United Arab Emirates, the
government chartered two real estate corporations that are funded by ADIA. Nakheel
Properties operates as state-owned enterprise while Emaar Properties functions as a
public-private partnership.28 Nakheel Properties often does business under the name
Dubai World. 29 Emaar Properties is publicly traded on the Dubai Financial Market. 3D
The two enterprises are officially competitors, but the companies often cooperate on

26 Information for companies owned by ADIC is available on the company's homepage.
Information was downloaded on Dec. 3,2010.
http://www.zawya.comlcrnlprofile.cfrnlcid777831
27 ADIA directly owns a 73% stake in the National Bank of Abu Dhabi (Roy, 2006).
28 Nakheel Properties receives a substantial amount of capital from both ADIA and
ADNOC. Of course, some of the capital invested by ADNOC might not otherwise be
invested in Nakheel Properties if ADIA did not exist.
29 The same Dubai World of the Dubai World's Ports Deal discussed in Chapter 1.
30 Emaar Properties conducts business under 60 different corporate names. Emaar
Middle East (EME) is a joint venture between Emaar Properties and Al Oula Real Estate
Development Company. EME was created to manage several high value projects in
Saudi Arabia. ADIA and ADIC, though, seldom do much business in other parts of the
Middle East.
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projects critical to the state. In these situations, Nakheel typically handles the financing
and construction of the project while Emaar Properties functions as the project manager.
Nakheel Properties and Emaar Properties recently completed two ambitious real
estate deals designed by the government to bolster the state's tourist base. The first deal
was the Dubai Palm Islands project, which consists of a series of islands jutting out into
the Persian Gulf (Stensgaard, 2004). Together the islands form the shape of a palm tree
surrounded by a crescent. 31 Resorts, entertainment centers, and high rise condos were
built on each island to attract tourists and real estate mogUls. The second deal completed
buildings for Middle Eastern branches of the Louvre and Guggenheim museums
(Cornwell, 2006; Goldenberg, 2006, Guggenheim, '2006; Manibo, 2008).
Large-scale construction projects, especially the massive Dubai Palm Islands deal,
increase demand for skilled labor in the construction and dredging sectors of the
economy. All three projects should increase occupational specialization over the longterm by adding new forms of employment in the service sector to handle increased
demands from tourists. Nakheel and Emaar also assist government efforts to establish the
United Arab Emirates as the regional service capitol of the Middle East. These
construction projects include a New York University campus and a regional outpost for
the Cleveland Clinic, and the recently completed Burj Khalifa (Stack, 2005; Lewis 2009).
The New York University campus should increase the number of the state's citizens that
receive a top-notch education. The Cleveland Clinic will elevate demand for highly
specialized medical personnel within the state. Many future projects, including the

The Dubai Palm Islands was divided into three separate projects: Palm Jumeirah, Palm
Jebel Ali, and Palm Deira. These names are often used interchangeably in news reports
and mass media.
31
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Nakheel Tower, have been put on hold till global financial prospects recover. I do not
expect ADIC's influence on the United Arab Emirates' domestic economy to diminish
anytime soon.

OVERVIEW
The concept of state-funded investment funds started in the 1950s. Traditionally
these funds were referred to as sovereign wealth management funds and divided into four
categories based on the fund's investment objective: official reserve funds, stabilization
funds, public pension funds, and state-owned enterprises. From the 1990s on, capital
levels increased in stabilization and public pension funds well beyond the level necessary
to achieve the fund's initial investment objective. The opportunity cost of idle capital
was too high for the state to ignore, so fund managers were tasked with wealth
accumulation as the fund's new primary investment objective. To accomplish this goal,
managers began to invest excess capital in riskier, growth-oriented financial products.
The term sovereign wealth fund was created to accurately reflect the shift in investment
objectives experienced by established wealth funds over the past two decades.
The second half of the chapter introduced my theory that sovereign wealth funds
assuage the political effects of the resource curse by promoting occupational
specialization and political transparency. The sovereign wealth fund exit to the resource
curse works by breaking the Dutch Disease cycle of deindustrialization and introducing a
resource-independent stream of government spending that invests in diverse economic
enterprises. Sovereign wealth funds accomplish these feats through the promotion of
fiscal stability and the creation of non-resource state-owned enterprises. The chapter

44

concluded with a brief case study that illustrates how my theory works in the real world
with regards to the United Arab Emirates' Abu Dhabi Investment Authority (ADIA)
sovereign wealth fund.
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CHAPTER IV

DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
The purpose of this chapter is to provide an overview of data collection efforts for
the time-series cross-sectional database I developed for this study. The chapter starts by
formally introducing my hypotheses then defines the dependent and independent
variables. Independent variables are broken down into three main sections: base model
variables, the explanatory variable, and test variables. The base model section is broken
down into two sub-sections: resource curse variables and control variables. The test
variables section is divided into two sub-sections. The first section introduces the
occupational specialization variables used to test hypotheses one and two. The second
section covers the test and unique control variables used to evaluate hypothesis three.
The chapter also introduces the multivariate auto-regressive integrated movingaverage (ARIMA) model I use in Chapter 5 to test the sovereign wealth fund effect on
regime type. The regime-estimation model is:
Regimej,t = al + b1(Oilj,t-s) + b2(Mineralsj,t_s) + b3(Loglncomej,t_s) + b4 (Islamj) +
bs(Regimej,t_s) + b6 (SWF),
where i is the state and t is the year. 32 The dependent variable Regime measures the
authoritarian and democratic characteristics of each government. The variables Oil and

I borrowed the basic elements of Michal Ross's regime estimation model to for my
statistical analysis; thus, my data collection techniques and variable names for control
variables will mimic those found in Ross's paper.
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Minerals respectively measure oil and mineral exports as a percent of gross domestic

product (GDP) for each year from 1970 to 2008. Log Income measures the natural
logarithm of GDP per capita for each year included in the study. Islam measures the
percent of each state's population that professed Islam as their faith in the year 2000.
Regime run on a five year lag is included in the model as an independent variable to

control for each state's unique historical trajectory. Finally, the variable SWF is a
dummy variable coded 1 for each year that a state had a sovereign wealth fund and 0
otherwise.
The data for this analysis was collected from the following sources: Freedom
House Inc. (FH); International Labour Organization (ILO); Polity IV Project: Political
Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2009 (Polity IV); Sovereign Wealth Fund
Institute (SWF Institute); Transparency International (TI); United Nations Educational,
Social, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO); World Bank, and the World Christian
Encyclopedia. Data was gathered for as many of the 192 member states of the United
Nations possible for the years 1970 to 2008. 33

HYPOTHESES
To answer the first question, I broke the central claim that sovereign wealth funds
promote occupational specialization into two testable hypotheses. The first hypothesis
(HI) is: Resource-reliant states with sovereign wealth funds create more occupational

specialization than resource-reliant states without those funds. The second hypothesis

By most accounts, there are 195 states in the world that meet the minimum criterion for
independence. The three states that meet the criterion for independence but are not UN
member states are Kosovo, Taiwan, and the Vatican City.
33
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(H 2) is: Greater levels of occupational specialization associated with sovereign wealth
funds result in less authoritarian regimes. That is, resource-reliant states with sovereign
wealth funds are less authoritarian than counterpart states, because the funds' promote
occupational specialization. I distilled the second research question into a third
hypothesis to test the transparency claim. The third hypothesis (H3) is: Sovereign wealth
fund states have lower corruption index scores compared to counterpart states.
To test the first hypothesis, I separate resource-reliant states into two groups
based on whether the state had a sovereign wealth fund or not and ran a difference in
means test. This difference in means test will tell us if sovereign wealth funds promote
occupational specialization. I test the second hypothesis using the regime-estimation
ARIMA model introduced at the beginning of this chapter. Examining parameter
variability within the model will tell us if the occupational specialization created by
sovereign wealth funds produces less authoritarian regimes (Ross, 2001).
I performed another separation of means test to determine if resource-reliant
states with sovereign wealth funds are more transparent than resource-reliant states
without these funds. Resource-reliant states are divided into two groups based on the
presence of sovereign wealth funds using the same methodology as the occupational
specialization difference in means test. 34 Finally, I introduce a transparency variable into
the ARIMA regime-estimation model to see if the difference in corruption levels
associated with sovereign wealth funds produces less authoritarian regimes.

34 In Chapter 5, I define resource-reliant states as any country where oil or mineral
exports exceed 5% of GDP over the time period that particular test covers. Both
difference in means tests and the political transparency ARIMA cover the time period
1992 to 2008. The ARIMA model for occupational specialization covers 1970 to 2008.
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DEPENDENT VARIABLE
The dependent variable Regime measures the presence of democratic and
authoritarian characteristics present in each state's government. Gurr, Jaggers, and
Marshall's Polity IV regime scores were used for this variable. The Polity I Project was
originally started by Ted Gurr with the intent of creating a database of authoritarian
regime characteristics that could be used in comparative quantitative analysis. The Polity
IV dataset is the most appropriate measure of regime type for my thesis because it does
not treat the concepts of democracy and autocracy as mutually exclusive forms of
government (Ross, 2001). Scores cover a 21 point range that offers a wider spectrum of
governance forms than other measures of regime type. This is important, because the
sovereign wealth fund effect may not be large enough to be fully captured by more
discrete measures of regime types.
The Polity IV Project run by Monty Marshall and Keith Jaggers updated the
Polity III scores by coding six different political characteristics indicative of authoritarian
or democratic rule (Gurr et aI, 2010). These six components further break down the four
principles present in government institutions that indicate regime type: qualities of
executive recruitment, constraints on executive authority, political competition, and
changes in the institutionalized qualities of governing authority (Gurr et aI, 2010).
A total of ten characteristics are coded: six for the components and four for the
principles. The Polity IV researchers evaluate each government using the ten
characteristics. If the government exhibits a democratic trait for that characteristic, that
aspect is coded + 1. If the government exhibits an authoritarian trait for that
characteristic, that aspect is coded -1 (Gurr et aI, 2010). The final regime score is
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calculated by adding the authoritarian and democratic scores together. The dataset for the
Polity IV Project covers every major, independent state in the world system with a
population of 500,000 or more. A total of 163 states are included in the Polity IV Project.
Polity scores range from -10 to + 1O. A score of -lOis assigned to a government
classified as a fully institutionalized autocracy such as a hereditary monarchy. A score of

+ 10 is assigned to states with fully consolidated democratic governments. Generally,
states with scores between -10 and -6 are called autocracies; scores from -5 to +5 are
called anocracies; and scores from +6 to + 10 are considered democracies. Incoherent
forms of government are assigned the special values of -66 and -99 (Marshall, Gurr, and
Harff, 1999). To make interpretation easier for this thesis, I followed Ross's lead and
rescaled the -10 to + 10 scores into a new scale ranging from 0 to 21 with a 0
corresponding to an original score of -10 and 21 corresponding to a + 10 (Ross, 2001).
Data is not available for states with populations less than 500,000?5 I borrowed
Ross's concept for countries excluded by the Polity IV Project. This methodology
creates a Polity IV score by adding the state's Freedom House scores for political rights
and civil liberties and rescaling the result onto a 21 point scale (Ross, 2001). After
transforming Freedom House Scores, regime data was available for all 190 states. 36
Incoherent forms of government coded as -66 or -99 are excluded.
The descriptive statistics can be found in Table 4.1 on the next page. There are
2,233 instances of autocratic governments in a given year over the 1970 to 2008 time
period covered in this study. Autocratic governments account for 33.8% of the total

Polity IV scores are available for every major oil exporting state except Brunei
Darussalam.
36 The two states missing data were Nauru and Tuvalu.
35
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available data. There are 1,442 instances of anocratic rule accounting for 21.80% of the
valid cases; and 2,940 instances of democratic rule accounting for 44.4% of valid cases.
Of the total data available, there were 268 cases of incoherent governments accounting
for 3.9%.

Table 4.1 Regime Type
Freguencies
Percent
Autocracy
2233
32.4
21.0
Anocracy
1442
Democracy
2940
42.7
Incoherent
268
3.9
Total
6883
100.0
Source: Gurr and Jaggers Polity IV and Freedom House Index

Valid Percent
33.8
21.8
44.4
100.0

INDEPENDENT VARIABLES: BASE MODEL
The base model includes five control variables. The base model is:
Regimej,t = a] + b](Oilj,t-s) + b2(Mineralsj,t_s) + b 3(LogIncomej,t_s) + b4(Islamj) +
bs(Regimej,t_s).
The variables Oil and Minerals are included to measure the resource curse effect
associated with oil and mineral exports. I explore these variables in the section resource
curse variables, Two variables are included to control for factors that modernization
scholars determined are vital determinants of democratization. These variables are Islam
and Log Income. I also included the variable Lag Regime in the base model. The
purpose of this variable is to control for each state's unique political history. The
variables Islam, Log Income, and Lag Regime are covered in the control variables section.
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RESOURCE CURSE VARIABLES
The variables Oil and Minerals are included to measure each state's economic
reliance on oil and mineral exports. 37 Data for these variables were downloaded from the
World Bank's World Development Indicators database. The database reports oil and
mineral exports as a percent of merchandise exports. These numbers were multiplied by
the total currency value of merchandise exports for the appropriate year to find the actual
value of oil and mineral exports for each case?8 That number was then divided by the
state's total GDP to calculate the percent of each state's GDP accounted for by oil and
mineral exports. Data for fuel and mineral exports are available from 1962 to 2008.
Oil export values include all mineral-based fuels as defined by the United Nations
Standard International Trade Classification (SITC) revision 3, sections 32 to 35. This
includes: coal, coke, and briquettes (32), petroleum and petroleum related products and
materials (33), natural and manufactured gas (34), and electric current (35). Mineral
export values include all ores and metals defined by the SITC revision 3, sections 27, 28,
and 68 under nonfuel minerals. This classification includes: crude fertilizer and
associated minerals (27), metalliferous ores and scrap (28), and non-ferrous metals (68).
Oil-reliant states are classified as any country where oil exports accounted for an average
of 5% of GDP between 1970 and 2008.
Following the methodology of Ross as well as Sachs and Warner, oil and mineral
export values for Singapore and Trinidad and Tobago were adjusted to reflect net exports
(Sachs and Warner, 1995; Sachs and Warner, 1999; Ross, 2001). This is necessary

37 The variables Oil and Minerals are similar to the variables used by Leite and
Weidmann (1999) and Ross (2001).
38 Each case represents one year for each state. All economic data is measured in current
U.S. dollars.
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because Singapore and Trinidad are major transshipment points for oil and minerals
extracted by states within the region (Sachs and Warner, 1995; Sachs and Warner, 1999;
Ross,2001). Reporting the World Bank numbers would artificially inflate the variables
Oil and Minerals for these two states. Singapore and Trinidad and Tobago were adjusted

to 0.01 %. Mineral-reliant states are classified as any country where mineral exports
accounted for an average of 5% of GDP between 1970 and 2008.
The descriptive statistics can be found in Table 4.2 for variable Oil. An adequate
number of data points were available for SPSS to create a moving average of the Oil
variable for 175 of the 190 states for which data was collected. Missing states account
for 7.9% of the 190 states included in the study. For the variable Oil: 32 states for which
data was available were oil-reliant accounting for 16.75% of the original 190 state
population and 18.29% of the 175 state-sample. There where 143 states not reliant on oil
exports accounting for 75.16% of the original 190 state population and 81.71 % of the 175
state-sample.

Table 4.2 Oil
Frequencies
Percent
Oil-Reliant States
32
16.75
Non Oil-Reliant States
143
75.16
Missing
7.9
15
Total
100.0
190
Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank

Valid Percent
18.29
81.71
100.0

The descriptive statistics can be found in Table 4.3 for the variable Minerals. An
adequate number of data points were available for SPSS to create a moving average for
the Minerals variable for 175 of the 190 states for which data was collected. Missing
states account for 7.9% of the 190 states included in the study. For the variable Minerals:
18 states for which data was available were mineral-reliant accounting for 9.47% of the .
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original 190 state population and 10.29% of the 175 state-sample. There where 157
states not reliant on mineral exports accounting for 82.63% of the original 190 state
population and 89.71 % of the 175 state-sample.

Table 4.3 Minerals
Frequencies
Mineral-Reliant States
18
Non Mineral-Reliant States
157
Missing
15
Total
190
Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank

Percent
9.47
82.63
7.9
100.0

Valid Percent
10.29
89.71
100.0

I ran a bivariate regression between the variable Regime and Oil. The dependent
variable was the moving average of Regime from 1970 to 2008. The independent
variable was the moving average of Oil for the same time period. To control for
autocorrelation and ensure causality, the variable Oil was run on a five year lag. The
bivariate coefficient between Regime and Oil was -0.277?9 This relationship is
significant at the 99% level with a p-value of 0.000.
Using the same methodology for variable Minerals that I used for the variable Oil,
the coefficient of the bivariate regression between the variables Regime and Minerals is 0.021. Interestingly, this relationship is not statistically significant with a p-value of
0.875. I reran the test using data from 1970 to 2000 and found that the relationship for
that time period was significant at the 95% level with a p-value of 0.024. Either the
states that emerged during the third wave of democratization, the commodity boom of the
past decade, or some combination of the two mitigated the mineral resource curse.

This methodology and the time periods covered are consistent with the multivariate
ARIMA model used in Chapter 5.

39

54

CONTROL VARIABLES
Islam is an important control variable because previous studies suggest that a

statistically significant negative correlation exists between states with a high population
percentage of Muslims and democratic rule (Bollen, 1983; Lipset, 1994; Saleme', 1994;
Waterbury, 1994; Barro, 1997; Midlarsky, 1998; Barro, 1999; Ross, 1999; Ross, 2001).
There also exists a strong correlation between the presence of Islam and oil reserves. The
exact coefficient size, theoretical explanations, and whether or not this relationship will
continue into the future are open for debate. 4o Without taking sides on this issue, I make
the assumption that Islam is currently strongly correlated with authoritarian rule and will
control for it appropriately.
The variable Islam measures the percent of a state's population who professed
Islam as their religious faith in 2000. The data comes from the second edition of the
World Christian Encyclopedia while missing values were collected from the

u.s.

Religious Freedom Report 2002, U.S. Religious Freedom Report 2006, the International
Religious Freedom Report 2009, and the UN Vital Statistics Report. Information was

obtained for all 190 states with known regime type. The Pearson correlation between the
variables Islam and Regime type in 2000 was -0.564 and was significant at the 99%
confidence level. The p-value reported by SPSS was 0.000. The Pearson correlation

Barro reported a correlation of (-0.38) between democracy and Islamic populations
(Barro, 1997: 13). Ross also found a correlation of (-0.44) between Islam and Oil.
Concerning the future of Islam and democratic rule, two predominantly Muslim states
have recently made sharp moves from authoritarian rule. Nigeria's Polity IV score
jumped from a -6 to +4 in 2000 and remained there shifting Nigeria from an autocracy to
an anocracy. Following the 1965 military coup and General Suharto's ascendance to the
presidency, Indonesia's score moved to -7 in 1970 and remained there until the late
1990s. In 2009, Indonesia's Polity IV score had risen to a +8. That moves Indonesia
from a solid autocratic to a solid democratic score in a decade.
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between Oil for the year 2008 and Islam is 0.30 and is significant at the 98% level with a
p-value of 0.005.
A breakdown of the descriptive statistics can be found in Table 4.4. The Muslim
population comprised less than 20% of the population in 134 states accounting for 70.5%
of the total 190 states included in the study. The Muslim population constituted 20% to
80% of the total population in 32 states accounting for 10.6% of the states. I ran a
bivariate regression model with the moving average of Regime for the years 1970 to 2008
as the dependent variable and Islam as the independent variable. The coefficient between

Regime and Islam is -9.212. The relationship is significant at the 99% level with a pvalue of 0.000.
Table 4.4 Islam
Frequencies
Percent
Valid Percent
0-20%
134
70.5
70.5
20-40%
9
4.7
4.7
40-60%
6
3.2
3.2
60-80%
7
3.7
3.7
80-100%
34
17.9
17.9
Total
190
100.0
100.0
Source: World Christian Encyclopedia; U.S. Religious Freedom Report 2002; U.S.
Religious Freedom Report 2006; International Religious Freedom Report 2009; and the
UN Vital Statistics Report
Income levels are an important prerequisite for democratization in modernization
theory (Lipset, 1959; Deutsch, 1961; Inglehart, 1997). The resource curse literature
emerged in part because resource-rich states did not democratize despite increasing
income levels. To ensure that income levels are high enough to promote democratization
in resource-rich states and that the tested effects are actually the true explanatory effects,
I include the Log Income variable in the base model. The Log Income variable measures
the natural log of real per capita GDP in current U.S. dollars.
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Data was downloaded from the World Bank's World Development Indicators
database. Source data for the World Indicators dataset comes from the OEeD National
Accounts data files and the World Bank's own national accounts data. The World Bank
calculates real GDP by adding the gross value added by all of a state's citizens to product
taxes and subtracting any subsidies not included in the value of the productS. 41 GDP per
capita is then calculated by dividing GDP by the state's midyear population. The data
used was reported in current U.S. dollar. Since per capita GDP can only be a positive
number, the log of per capita GDP is used instead. Using the natural log also makes
interpretation easier.
The descriptive statistics can be found in Table 4.5. There are 175 cases of states
with log income levels between 0 and 1.9. These low income states account for 3.6% of
the total cases. 68.3% of the states have log income levels between 2.0 and 2.9. And
28.1 % of these states have log income levels between 3.0 and 4.0. The bivariate
coefficient between the moving average of Regime from 1970 to 2008 and the moving
average of Log Income run on a five year lag is 2.939. The relationship is significant at
the 99% level.

Table 4.5 Log Income
Frequencies
Percent
0-l.9
175
2.9
2.0-2.9
3338
55.3
3.0-4.0
1375
22.8
Missing
1150
19.0
6038
Total
100.0
Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank

Valid Percent
3.6
68.3
28.1
100.0

41 The World Bank does not include deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or
the depletion of natural resources in its calculations for Real GDP.
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INDEPENDENT VARIABLE: EXPLANATORY VARIABLE

The variable Sovereign Wealth Fund is a dummy variable that measures the
presence of a wealth fund for each country. The variable is coded 1 for each year that a
state possesses a sovereign wealth fund and 0 for any year it does not. The time series
covers the time period from 1970 to 2010. The data for these variables was compiled
from data available on the Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute's homepage. See Appendix
B for the data used to create this variable. The descriptive statistics can be found in Table
4.6. Data was available for all 190 states included in the study. There are 6,728 cases of
the Sovereign Wealth Fund variable that SPSS can utilize to create a moving average
variable. Of these cases, 420 were coded 1 for the presence of a sovereign wealth fund
and 6,308 were coded 0 to indicate the absence of a sovereign wealth fund in a state for a
speCific year.
The variable Sovereign Wealth Fund does not distinguish between capitalization
sources in the statistical analysis; however, I do break down the states here by funding
source for the reader. States with sovereign wealth funds capitalized by oil exports are:
Algeria, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Brunei, East Timor, Iran, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Libya,
Mauritania, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Qatar, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Trinidad and Tobago,
the United Arab Emirates, and Venezuela. States with funds capitalized by minerals are:
Botswana (diamonds and minerals), Chile (copper), and Kiribati (phosphates). States
with funds capitalized by non-commodity sources are: Australia, Brazil, China, France,
Hong Kong, Indonesia, Ireland, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore, South Korea, and
Vietnam.
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Running a bivariate regression with Regime as the dependent variable and the
moving average of Sovereign Wealth Fund as the independent variable produced a
coefficient of -3.952 that is significant at the 98% level with a p-value of 0.007.
Consistent with the methodology of this paper, the variable Sovereign Wealth Fund was
run on a 5 year lag. Since the variable Sovereign Wealth Fund is a dummy variable, the
coefficient is the actual difference in the regime score for states with and without
sovereign wealth funds. Therefore, sovereign wealth funds are associated with a decrease
of 3.952 points on the 21 point Polity IV scale.
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Table 4.6 Sovereign Wealth Funds
Frequencies
States with SWF
420
States w/o SWF
6308
Total
6728
Source: Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute

Percent
6.2
93.8
100.0

Valid Percent
6.2
93.8
100.0

INDEPENDENT TEST VARIABLES: HYPOTHESES ONE AND TWO
Occupational specialization is a key link between economic growth and
democracy according to modernization theory (Lipset, 1958; Inglehart, 1960; Deutsch,
1961). Ross also found that occupational specialization appeared to be the only causal
mechanism between modernization theory and the resource curse (Ross, 2001).43 The
first two hypotheses test the claim that resource-reliant states with sovereign wealth funds
generate more occupational specialization by reinvesting excess capital than counterpart

42 The bivariate regression analysis does not control for resource exports. I expect the
relationship between sovereign wealth funds to shift positive after controlling for the
resource curse effects.
43 The Dutch Disease section of Chapter 2 offers a more detailed explanation of how
occupational specialization affects democratization.
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states that do not have sovereign wealth funds. The first hypothesis (HI) is: Resource-

reliant states with sovereign wealth funds create more occupational specialization than
resource-reliant states without those funds. The second hypothesis (H2) is: Greater
levels of occupational specialization result in less authoritarian regimes in resourcereliant states with sovereign wealth funds compared to counterpart without sovereign
wealth funds. To test the occupational specialization claim, I added four new variables to
the multivariate model: Men in Industry, Women in Industry, Men in Services, and

Women in Services. The model for hypotheses one and two is:
Regimej,t = al + bl (Oilj,t-s) + b2(Mineralsj,t_5) + b3 (Loglncomej,t_5) + b4(Islamj) +
b 5(Regimej.t-5) + b6 (SWFi,t-5) + b 7 (Government Activityi,t-s) + b 8(Men in Industryi,t-s) +
b 9 (Women in IndustrYj,t_5) + bJO(Men in Servicesi,t_s) + bll(Women in Servicesj,t_s).
The variables Men in Industry and Women in Industry measure the percent of the working
population that are employed in industrial activities, while the variables Men in Services
and Women in Services measures the percent of the working population that are
employed in the service sector.
The data for the occupational specialization variables was downloaded from the
ILO's online Laborsta database page. The information can be found in Table IC:
Economically Active Population, by occupation and status in employment. The ILO
collected data for this table from UNESCO educational surveys and government census
forms. 44 Missing values were inputted from the World Bank's World Development
Indicators database. In the ILO dataset, information is reported in three classification
categories: International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC) revision 4, International

44 This data can be found in print in the ILO's Yearbook of Labour Statistics.
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Classification of Status in Employment (lSCE) 1958, and International Classification of
Status in Employment (ISCE) 1993.
The World Bank data was reported in two classification categories: ISIC revision
2 and ISIC revision 3. Industrial sectors are defined in ISIC revision 4 in tabulation
categories B-F and include: mining and quarrying (B); manufacturing (C); electricity,
gas, steam, and air conditioning supply (D); water supply including sewerage, waste
management, and remediation activities (E); and construction (F). Full classifications
and subcategories for all five classifications can be found in Appendix C. The variables
Men in Industry and Women in Industry were created by adding these categories together
which yields the percent of the working population employed in industrial activity.
Descriptive statistics for industrial participation variables can be found in Table
4.7 and Table 4.8. Data was available for 33.1 % of the total cases for the variable Men in
Industry and 32.5% of the total cases for the variable Women in Industry. Enough data
was available for SPSS to create moving averages of both variables for 172 of the 190
states included in the time-series cross-sectional dataset. That accounts for 90.53% of the
total 190 state population.

Table 4.7 Men in Industry
Frequencies
Percent
Men in Industry
2224
33.1
4504.
Data Missing
66.9
Total
6728
100.0
Source: Laborsta Dataset, !LO and World Economic Indicators, World Bank
Table 4.8 Women in Industry
Percent
Frequencies
2186
Women in Industry
32.5
Data Missing
4542
67.5
Total
6728
100.0
Source: Laborsta Dataset, ILO and World Economic Indicators, World Bank
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The bivariate coefficient between the moving average of Regime and the moving
average of Men in Industry run on a five year lag is 0.194. The bivariate coefficient
between the moving average of Regime and the moving average of Women in Industry
run on a five year lag is 0.097. The relationship between Regime and Men in Industry is
significant at the 99% level; however, the relationship between Regime and Women in
Industry is not statistically significant. The p-value for Men in Industry was 0.000, while
the p-value for Women in Industry was 0.132.
Service sector activity is defined in ISle revision 4 in tabulation categories G-P
and include: wholesale and retail trade including repair of motor vehicles (G);
transportation and storage (H); accommodation and food service activities (I);
information and communication (J); financial and insurance activities (K); real estate
activities (L); professional, scientific, and technical activities (M); administrative and
support service activities (N); public administration and defense including compulsory
social security (0); education (P); human health and social work activities (Q); arts,
entertainment, and recreation (R); other service activities (S); and household activities
including the production of undifferentiated goods and services (T). Full classifications
and subcategories for all five classifications can be found in Appendix D. The variables
Men in Services and Women in Services were created by adding these categories together
which yields the percent of the working population employed in service activity.
Descriptive statistics for the service sector participation variables can be found in
Table 4.9 and Table 4.10 on the next page. The coefficient between the moving average
of Regime and Men in Services from 1970 to 2008 is 0.046. The coefficient between the
moving average of Regime and Women in Services from 1970 to 2008 is 0.080. The
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relationship between Regime and Men in Services is not significant; however, the
relationship between Regime and Women in Services is significant at the 99% level. In
other words, occupational specialization does affect regime type, but only for men in
industry and women in services. The p-value for Men in Services was 0.265, while the pvalue for Women in Services was 0.001.

Table 4.9 Men in Services
Frequencies

Percent

2223
33.0
Men in Industry
4505
67.0
Data Missing
6728
100.0
Total
Source: Laborsta Dataset, ILO and World Economic Indicators, World Bank
Table 4.10 Women in Services
Frequencies
2187

Percent
32.5

Women in Industry
4541
Data Missing
67.5
6728
Total
100.0
Source: Laborsta Dataset, ILO and World Economic Indicators, World Bank

INDEPENDENT TEST VARIABLES: HYPOTHESIS THREE
I distilled the transparency claim into a the third hypothesis (H3): Resourcereliant states with sovereign wealth funds have lower corruption index scores compared
to resource-reliant states without sovereign wealth funds. My claim is that despite
opaque structures, sovereign wealth funds still increase government transparency since
fund managers must comply with local security laws present in the states where they
invest money; and sovereign wealth funds unveil government's finances to the citizens
employed by the fund. As assets have increased, sovereign wealth fund managers have
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gained a significant amount of economic power within the government that created the
fund (Rozanov, 2005). That power might also elevate transparency levels.
More capital available for investment motivated many governments to seek
external advice regarding the strategy and management of its sovereign wealth fund. The
massive $700 billion AIDA fund created by the United Arab Emirates leads the way in
this regard. In 2008, AIDA executives met with a who's who of Wall Street including:
veteran investor Wilbur Ross, Blackrock Financial CEO Larry Fink, Goldman Sachs
CEO Lloyd Blankfein, and Warren Buffet from Berskhire Hathaway. Also, 70% of the
fund's 1,100 professional employees are foreigners mainly educated in the United States
and Europe (Thornton and Reed, 2008).
To test hypothesis three, I created the variable Political Transparency, which
measures the level of perceived corruption present in the government of each state for
each year from 1995 to 2008. The variables Political Stability and Foreign Direct
Investment are included to control for any correlation between stable governments and
sovereign wealth funds that might exist. The model for the second claim is:
Regimej,t = al + b l (Oilj,t-s) + b2 (Mineralsj,t_s) + b 3(LogIncomej,t_s) + b4 (Islamj) +
bs(Regimej,t-s) + b6 (SWFi,t-s) + b 7(Political TransparencYj,t_s) +
B 8(Political Stabilityi.t_s) + b9 (Foreign Direct Investmenti.t_s).
The test variable for this claim is Political Transparency. The variable was
created by downloading each state's Corruption Perception Index (CPI) from the
Transparency International online database. According to Transparency International,
the CPI is a "survey of surveys," combining data from thirteen different global surveys
that measure the perceived level of corruption in each state. A higher score on the index
means that state is more transparent, while a lower score translates to a less transparent

64

state. Data is available for 177 of the 192 United Nations member states from 1998 to
2010.
Data was missing for: Andorra, Azerbaijan, the Bahamas, the Federated States of
Micronesia, Fiji, Liechtenstein, the Marshall Islands, Monaco, North Korea, Palua, San
Marino, St. Kitts and Nevis, and Suriname. The lowest score possible is a 1 and the
highest score possible is a 10. Transparency International collected data from ten
independent institutions for the 2009 index including: Columbia University, Economists
Intelligence Unit, Freedom House, Information International, International Institute for
Management Development, Merchant International Group, Political and Economic Risk
Consultancy, United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, World Economic Forum,
and World Markets Research Centre. Descriptive statistics can be found in Table 4.11.
78.08% of the 177 states that data was available for had a CPI score below 5, indicating
that these states are not transparent. Only 21.92% of the 177 states were classified as
transparent.

Table 4.11 Political Transparency
Freguencies
Percent
4.44
1-1.9
109
20.81
2-2.9
511
367
14.94
3-3.9
190
7.74
4-4.9
130
5.29
5-5.9
6-6.9
101
4.11
7-7.9
89
3.62
3.54
8-8.9
87
9-10
90
3.66
31.84
Missing
782
Total
2456
100.0
Source: Corruption Perception Index, Transparency International
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Valid Percent
6.51
30.53
21.92
11.35
7.77
6.03
5.32
5.20
5.38
100.0

I ran a bivariate regression analysis to determine the correlation between the
presence of sovereign wealth funds and political transparency. The dependent variable
was the mean of the variables Political Transparency from the years 1995 to 2008. The
independent variable was the mean of the variables Sovereign Wealth Fund for the same
time period. The variable Mean Sovereign Wealth Fund had a coefficient of 1.589 and is
significant at the 98% confidence level. The p-value was 0.007.
While researching emerging market BRIC states for Goldman Sachs, Jim O'Neill
and his fellow economists discovered a large and highly significant correlation between
greater levels of political stability and increased levels of foreign direct investment
(O'Neill, 2007).45 If sovereign wealth funds are related to higher levels of political
stability, then increased foreign direct investment might account for greater occupational
specialization in sovereign wealth fund states. I created the variables Foreign Direct
Investment and Political Stability to control for the possibility that political transparency

is correlated with both political stability and foreign direct investment.
The variable Political Stability measures the year over year change in each state's
Polity IV score for every year in the analysis. This variable was created by subtracting
the previous year's Polity IV score from the current year's Polity IV score. If no change
was measured, a 0 was coded for that year. This method produces both positive and
negative values. A positive value indicates a political movement towards
democratization, whereas a negative value indicates a political movement towards more
authoritarianism. Since we are only interested in the magnitude of political change and

45 The citation came form The BRICs and Beyond, a book published by Goldman Sachs
in 2007. The claim originated in a Goldman Sachs working paper titled "The World
Needs Better Economic BRICs" published in 1999. The term BRIC stands for the large
emerging market states of Brazil, Russia, India, and China.
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not the direction of that change, the absolute value of these scores was taken. The result
is a positive number showing the size of the political movement, but not the direction of
that movement.
Descriptive statistics for the variable Political Stability can be found in Table
4.12. After controlling for incoherent forms of government, data was available for 95%
of the 6,728 total cases. There were 5,675 cases for where no regime change occurred.
This accounts for 88.8% of the available data. Polity IV defines a "minor regime
change" as a shift of 1 to 6 points. There were 578 minor regimes changes accounting for
9.0% of the valid cases. Polity IV defines a "major regime change" as a shift of 7 to 20
points. There were 137 major regime changes accounting for 2.1 % of the valid cases.
Table 4.12 Political Stability
Frequencies
Percent
Valid Percent
84.3
o
5675
88.8
1-6
578
8.6
9.0
7-20
2.0
137
2.1
Missing
338
5.0
Total
6728
100.0
100.0
Source: Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2009
I ran a bivariate regression analysis to determine the coefficient between the
presence of sovereign wealth funds and political stability. The dependent variable was
the mean of the variable Political Stability from the years 1970 to 2008. The independent
variable was the mean of the variable Sovereign Wealth Fund from 1970 to 2008. The
variable Mean Sovereign Wealth Fund had a coefficient of -0.330. The relationship was
not statistically significant, because the p-value was only 0.126.
The variable Foreign Direct Investment was downloaded from the World Bank's
World Economic Indicators database. The variable isjoreign direct investment (net

67

inflow, % GDP).46 The World Bank defines foreign direct investment (FDI) as the net
inflow of investment capital used to attain a management interest in enterprises that
operate in a state other than the investor's own state. 47 The World Bank uses the balance
of payments method to measure the net inflow of FDI in current U.S. dollars measured as
a percent of GDP.

48

Net inflows are calculated by subtracting new investment inflows

minus disinvestment outflows. This method allows scholars to determine if a state is a
net creditor or a net debtor. 49 Data was collected from reports filed by foreign investors.
Descriptive statistics for the variable Foreign Direct Investment can be found in Table
4.13. Data was available for 5,046 of the 6,728 total cases. This accounts for 75.0% of
the total available cases. SPSS was able to create the moving average of this variable for
all 190 states.

Table 4.13 Foreign Direct Investment
Frequencies
Foreign Direct Investment
5046
1682
Data Missing
6728
Total
Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank

Percent
75.0
25.0
100.0

46 Foreign Direct Investment Data for the Federated States of Micronesia, Iraq, Marshall
Islands, Palau, Qatar, Timor Leste, and the United Arab Emirates was downloaded from
the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCT AD).
47 Management interest is defined as 10% or more of the voting stock in the enterprise
being purchased. FDI is calculated by adding equity capital, reinvestment of earnings,
and other assorted long-term and short-term capital included in the balance of payments.
48 The balance of payments method reflects account transactions only.
49 Under this measurement methodology, States with a negative FDI are net debtors,
while states with a positive FDI are net creditors.
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OVERVIEW
Chapter four introduced the three hypotheses and two ARIMA regime-estimation
models that will be used to test my claim that states with sovereign wealth funds have
higher levels of occupational specialization and political transparency that produce less
authoritarian regimes than counterpart states that lack these funds. The first hypothesis
(HI) is: Resource-reliant states with sovereign wealth funds create more occupational

specialization than resource-reliant states without those funds. The second hypothesis
(H 2) is: Greater levels of occupational specialization result in less authoritarian regimes
in resource-reliant states with sovereign wealth funds versus counterpart states. The
third hypothesis (H3) is: Sovereign wealth fund states have lower corruption index scores
compared to counterpart states.
The base model includes the control variables Oil and Minerals that measure the
presence of the resource curse in each state. Islam and Log Income are included to
control for known authoritarian and democratic effects that Islam and income exert on
governments. The variable Sovereign Wealth Fund was added to control for the presence
of sovereign wealth funds in each state. The four variables for occupational
specialization and the variable Political Transparency were added to test my claims that
the presence of sovereign wealth funds lead to less authoritarian regimes. And finally,
the variables Political Stability and Foreign Direct Investment were added to ensure that
a more transparent government is really the explanatory variable for less authoritarian
governments.
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CHAPTER V

INFERENTIAL STATISTICS
The purpose of this chapter is to present the inferential statistics, difference in
means tests, and auto-regressive integrated moving average (ARIMA) model I use to test
the claim that resource-reliant states with sovereign wealth funds are less authoritarian
than counterpart states that do not utilize sovereign wealth funds. My theory is based on
two central claims. The first claim is that states with sovereign wealth funds invest more
capital in its own economy over time. That is, sovereign wealth funds offer a second
source of capital separate from oil and mineral tariffs that states use to advance its
domestic economy leading to greater levels of occupational specialization. The second
claim is that increased levels of occupational specialization associated with sovereign
wealth funds states equate to less-authoritarian rule. And the third claim is that despite
the opaque nature of sovereign wealth funds, states that operate these funds are forced to
conduct government activities more transparently than resource-reliant states that do not
have sovereign wealth funds.

METHODOLOGY
I use a pooled time-series cross-sectional dataset composed of repeated
observations on states over a thirty-eight year period from 1970 to 2008 to construct the
multivariate model used to test my hypotheses that sovereign wealth funds mitigate the
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antidemocratic effects of the resource curse. The major advantage of using a time-series
cross-national dataset lies in the dramatic increase in the size ofN (sample size) and T
(time points) (Beck and Katz, 1995; Beck and Katz, 1996; Beck et. aI, 1993; and Sayers,
1989). The disadvantages of using time-series cross-sectional are the methodological
challenges associated with the various types of regression analysis.
Using ordinary least squares (OLS) regression analysis is problematic due to the
unique temporal and spatial properties inherent to time-series cross-national datasets that
lead to time-correlated errors and heteroskedasticity (Beck and Katz, 1995). To
overcome this problem, Richard Parks suggested using the optimal characteristics of
generalized least squares (GLS) regression analysis; however, this method has its own
problems for time-series cross-sectional datasets (Parks, 1967). The problem with Park's
GLS method of regression analysis is the model's reliance on information about the error
process that we do not have in real life. Thus, GLS regression analysis will tend to
severely underestimate parameter variability by anywhere from 50% to 300% (Beck and
Katz, 1995).
Since I do not have the error process information available for the ARIMA model
that allows the use of GLS, it appears that the only other option is the vastly more
complicated feasible generalized least squares (FGLS) regression analysis. According to
Nathaniel Beck and Jonathon Katz, FGLS is: " ... 'feasible' because it uses an estimate of
the error process, avoiding the GLS assumption that the error process is known" (Beck
and Katz, 1995: 634). However, Beck and Katz have provided a pathway to return to
OLS regression analysis. First, the temporal issues associated with pooled time-series
cross-sectional data can be handled by lagging the dependent variable. This method
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eliminates serial correlation of the errors allowing the use of OLS regression analysis to
estimate the parameters of the model. Standard errors should be calculated using panelcorrected standard errors (PCSE). The OLS residuals can then be checked to ensure that
the model is free of the more severe cases of heteroskedasticity or contemporaneous
correlation of the errors (Beck and Katz, 1995).
In order to analyze how sovereign wealth funds affect occupational specialization
and political transparency, I created two auto-regressive integrated moving average
(ARIMA) models. The first two model measures how sovereign wealth funds and
occupational specialization affect regime type, while the third and fourth models test the
transparency claim. Model I (MI) includes the five control variables from the base
model along with the four variables that measure occupational specialization: Men in
Industry, Women in Industry, Men in Services, Women in Services. This model tests the

claim that sovereign wealth funds increase occupational specialization, which then
cultivates less authoritarian regimes. Model 2 (M2) tests the political transparency claim.
Model 2 includes the five control variables from the base model as well as the control
variables Political Stability and Foreign Direct Investment. This model tests the claim
that sovereign wealth funds increase political transparency, thus mitigating the
antidemocratic effects of the resource curse. The test variable for Model 2 is Political
Transparency.

OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALIZATION

My first hypothesis (Hd is: Resource-reliant states with sovereign wealth funds
create more occupational specialization than resource-reliant states without those funds.
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To test this claim, I ran an independent samples t-test for the level of occupational
specialization between resource-reliant states with sovereign wealth funds and resourcereliant states without sovereign wealth funds. I defined resource-reliant states for this test
as any state that where oil or mineral exports account for an average of 5% of GDP for
the time period 1992 to 2008. Of the 190 states with known regime type, 15 states do not
have any information about oil or mineral exports from the time period 1992 to 2008.
That leaves 175 states with at least one year of oil or mineral export data available.
Since this study is focused on democratization, I deleted any state that had already
democratized by 1992. Any state that was democratic in 1992, but autocratic or
authoritarian in 2008 was left in the study. 50 This method produced a total of 31 oilreliant states and 14 mineral-reliant states. There were five states that were both oilreliant and mineral-reliant during that period, which yields a total of 40 resource-reliant
states from 1992 to 2008. 51 See Appendix E and Appendix F for a full list of the 40
resource-reliant states.
Running a difference in means test for the occupational specialization variables is
difficult, because occupational specialization data is not available for every state. Even
when data is available for a state, the date might not be available for every year. Given
the limited access to data for occupational specialization, I created new variables for all
four measures of occupational specialization by finding the means of each state for every
year available from 1992 to 2008. 52 The problem is further compounded by the fact that

This methodology is consistent throughout Chapter 5.
51 Iraq is excluded for the time period 1992 to 2008, because the regime data indicates an
incoherent government for much of this time period.
52 I separate the occupational specialization variables throughout this study to control for
the disparate effects of male and female labor in Muslim states.
50
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stabilization and public pension funds do not transform into sovereign wealth funds
immediately. I started the test with states that had established stabilization or public
pension funds by 1987. By choosing 1987, the states had five years during the bull
market of the late 1980s and the oil price spike associated with the Gulf War to grow its
fund. 53 This method provides the greatest confidence that these funds were acting as
sovereign wealth funds from the period 1992 to 2008. That left five states with sovereign
wealth funds: Brunei Darussalam, Kuwait, Libya, Oman, and the United Arab Emirates.
Data for the occupational specialization difference in means test can be found in
Table 5.1 on the next page. The results were mixed for industrial sector participation.
The tests indicate that sovereign wealth funds increase male participation and decrease
female participation in the industrial sector; however, neither of these variables was
statistically significant. The p-value for Men in Industry was 0.457, while the p-value for
Women in Industry was 0.393. The service sector tests revealed that a statistically
significant relationship exists between sovereign wealth funds and participation in the
service sector. Sovereign wealth funds are associated with an increase of 15.95
percentage points for the Men in Services. This relationship was significant at the 95%
confidence interval with a p-value of 0.025. For Women in Services, the increase in
service sector participation was 32.99 percentage points. This relationship was
statistically significant at the 98% confidence level with a p-value of 0.010.
Extant literature on the resource curse and Dutch Disease assume that
deindustrialization prevents democratization. The existing literature does not discuss
how service sector jobs affect democratization. The large and statistically significant

53 Shifting the cut-off point to 1990 does not add any additional states to the sample.
Norway officially chartered its fund in 1990.
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difference in means for service sector participation associated with sovereign wealth
funds imply that these funds might bypass the industrialization stage and move directly to
service oriented economies. I am not sure at this time how this particular pathway to
economic modernization will affect regime outcomes.

Table 5.1 Comparison of Means Test for Occupational Specialization 1992-2008
Sovereign
Valid
No Sovereign
Wealth Fund
Cases
Wealth Fund
Men in Industry
27.88
24.42
5
Women in Industry
9.05
5
13.37
Men in Services
63.16
5
47.21
Women in Services
88.46
5
55.47
Source: Independent samples t-test performed in SPSS
n=40

Valid
Cases
35
35
35
35

Sig.
0.457
0.393
0.025
0.010

MODEL 1: OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALIZATION
Hypothesis two (H2) states: Greater levels of occupational specialization result in

less authoritarian regimes in resource-reliant states with sovereign wealth funds
compared to counterpart states without sovereign wealth funds. To test this claim, I
added the occupational specialization variables to the base model described in Chapter 4.
The model uses the pooled time-series cross-sectional dataset of states that I constructed.
To control for multicollinearity between sovereign wealth funds and natural resources, I
centered the variables by subtracting the means. The regression model is:
Regimei,t = al + b l (Oili,t-s) + b2(Mineralsi,t_s) + b3(LogIncomei,t_s) + b4(Islami) +
bs(Regimei,t-s) + b6(SWFi.t-s) + b7 (Men in IndustrYi.t_s) + bg(Women in IndustrYi,t_s) +
b9 (Men in Servicesi,t_s) + blO(Women in Servicesi,t_s).
I first ran the ARIMA model with the following independent variables: Oil,

Minerals, Log Income, Islam, Regime, Men in Industry, Women in Industry, Men in
Services, and Women in Services. After controlling for states that were already
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democratic, there were 32 oil-reliant and 18 mineral-reliant states for the time period
1970 to 2008. Five states were both oil-reliant and mineral-reliant. There were 45
resource-reliant states. SPSS was able to use data on all but six of those states. See
Appendix G and Appendix H for a break down of resource-reliant states from 1970 to
2008. The results for the first occupational specialization regression can be found in
Table 5.2. The industrial sector variables indicate that industrialization hinders
democratization, while the service sector variables indicate that service sector
participation promotes democratization. None of the four occupational variables
remained statistically significant after adding the control variables to the equation. These
findings bring into question the claim that occupational specialization remains necessary
before democratization efforts can occur. 54
Table 5.2 Occupational Specialization Regression I

Coefficient
n=39
Oil
-0.087
Minerals
0.020
Islam
-2.248
Log Income
1.797
0.670
Lag Regime
Men in Industry
-0.061
Women in Industry
0.009
Men in Services
-0.006
Women in Services
0.011
Source: SPSS Multivariate Regression Analysis

Standard Error
0.039
0.051
1.395
1.657
0.116
0.062
0.064
0.044
0.035

Sig.
0.036
0.694
0.119
0.288
0.000
0.340
0.887
0.886
0.745

The intent was to add the variable Sovereign Wealth Fund to the ARIMA model
to see if the occupational specialization effect diminished in statistical significance after
controlling for the presence of a sovereign wealth fund. Since occupational

Another interesting finding that emerged from this regression is the positive and
insignificant relationship between mineral exports and regime type. This suggests that
the resource curse might apply to minerals beyond the Third Wave of Democratization.
54
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specialization does not appear to influence regime type anymore, I included the variable
Sovereign Wealth Fund to see if the occupational specialization variables increased in

statistical significance. The results for this regression can be found in Table 5.3 on the
next page. The new variable did not change the results, nor did adding the additional
regional effect dummy variables. The results for the third regression can be found in
Table 5.4 on the next page. The variable Sovereign Wealth Fund was not significant and
the coefficient was still negative. There are two ways to interpret these results. The first
is that sovereign wealth funds exert two counter effects on regime type. The first effect
promotes authoritarian rule, as evidenced in the significant and negative correlation
between sovereign wealth funds and regime type seen in the bivariate relationship. The
second effect promotes democratization through occupational specialization.

Table 5.3 Occupational Specialization Regression II
Coefficient
n=39
Oil
-0.086
Minerals
0.020
Islam
-2.233
Log Income
1.781
Lag Regime
0.670
-0.065
Sovereign Wealth Fund
-0.061
Men in Industry
Women in Industry
0.010
Men in Services
-0.006
Women in Services
0.012
Source: SPSS Multivariate Regression Analysis

Standard Error
0.042
0.052
1.462
1.726
0.118
1.416
0.064
0.067
0.045
0.036

Sig.
0.049
0.706
0.139
0.312
0.000
0.964
0.351
0.883
0.890
0.749

The comparison of means test suggests that sovereign wealth funds increase the
labor participation in the service sector of the economy in resource-reliant states. The
bivariate relationship also suggests that this should lead to less authoritarian rule.
However, this scenario remains unlikely as both sovereign wealth funds and occupational
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specialization lack statistical significance after controlling for oil and mineral exports.
Therefore the second, more likely interpretation is that sovereign wealth funds do not
affect regime type. Sovereign wealth funds are negatively correlated with regime type;
however, the large drop in statistical significance that occurs after controlling for oil
exports implies that resource exports are the real explanatory factor.
Controlling for the regional variables Latin America, Middle East, Sub-Saharan

Africa, and the Arabian Peninsula as well as the variable Small States does not change
the outcome. 55 The full results can be found in Table 5.4. The presence of sovereign
wealth funds and occupational specialization remain insignificant determinants of regime
type after controlling for regional effects. In fact, the only significant factor that affected
regime type in this model was Lag Regime. Islam drops in statistical significance after
controlling for the Middle East and Sub-Saharan Africa because of its high correlation
with these regions. Even the variable Oil drops from significance. These results suggest
that the entire resource curse premise should be reexamined. Perhaps an agent-based
formal model might offer a better understanding of the unique regional characteristics of
the resource curse than traditional regression models.

The Latin America variable was added at the last minute. It was suggested by a
professor on my committee. Thad Dunning (2008) published an article recently that
suggests resources aid democratization efforts in Latin American states.

55
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Table 5.4 Occupational Specialization Regression III
Coefficient
n=39
Oil
-0.084
Minerals
0.007
Islam
-1.004
Log Income
1.399
Lag Regime
0.656
Sovereign Wealth Fund
-0.010
-0.054
Men in Industry
Women in Industry
0.027
-0.005
Men in Services
Women in Services
0.011
Latin America
-0.427
Middle East
-2.393
Sub-Saharan
-0.140
1.054
Arabian Peninsula
Small States
-1.342
Source: SPSS Multivariate Regression Analysis

Standard Error
0.049
0.058
2.008
2.117
0.146
1.665
0.086
0.080
0.051
0.039
2.476
2.252
2.171
2.534
1.924

Sig.
0.103
0.900
0.622
0.516
0.000
0.995
0.539
0.735
0.918
0.777
0.865
0.300
0.949
0.682
0.493

POLITICAL TRANSPARENCY
To test the claim that resource-reliant states with sovereign wealth funds are more
transparent than counterpart states without these funds, I first ran a separation of means
test to see if the basic premise of this claim was true. The same definition for resourcereliant states that I used to test occupational specialization was applied for this test. A
full list of those states can be found in Appendix E and Appendix F. A resource-reliant
state is any state where oil or mineral exports account for an average of 5% of the state's
GDP over the time period 1992 and 2008. Oil and mineral export data was not available
for 15 of the 190 UN member states, leaving a total of 175 states with at least one year of
data. Consistent with the previous methodology, I deleted any state that was democratic
in both 1992 and 2008. Of the remaining states, 31 states were oil-reliant and 14 were
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mineral-reliant. After taking into account the five states that were both oil-reliant and
mineral-reliant during this time period, this method left 40 resource-reliant states.
I applied the same methodology that was utilized in the occupational
specialization difference in means tests. I ran the test by comparing states that had
established stabilization or public pension funds by 1987 against states that had not
created funds by 1987. By choosing 1987, the states had five years during the bull
market of the late 1980s and the oil price spike associated with the Gulf War to grow its
fund capital above the levels needed for stabilization or pension obligations. This method
provides the greatest confidence that these funds were truly acting as sovereign wealth
funds from the period 1992 onward. That left five states with sovereign wealth funds:
Brunei Darussalam, Kuwait, Libya, Oman, and the United Arab Emirates. I calculated a
new variable called Mean Political Transparency by finding the mean transparency score
of every state available from 1995 to 2008. The results for the comparison of means test
suggest that resource-reliant states with sovereign wealth funds have a Corruption
Perception Index score 1.3072 points higher than counterpart states. This relationship
was statistically significant at the 95% confidence level with a p-value of 0.024. In other
words, I am 95% certain that we can reject the null hypothesis that sovereign wealth
funds do not affect a state's transparency.
Table 5.5 Comparison of Means Test for Political Transparency 1992-2008
n=40

Sovereign
Wealth Fund

Valid
Cases

No Sovereign
Wealth Fund

Political
3.8292
5
2.5220
Transparency
Source: Independent samples t-test performed in SPSS
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Valid
Cases

Sig.

35

0.024

MODEL 2: POLITICAL TRANSPARENCY
My third hypothesis (H3) is: Resource-reliant states with sovereign wealth funds

have lower corruption index scores compared to counterpart states without sovereign
wealth funds. To test this claim, I employed the same base model with five control
variables used to construct Modell. The variable Political Transparency was added to
measure the antidemocratic effects associated with sovereign wealth funds. I also added
the variables Political Stability and Foreign Direct Investment to control for any effect
these factors may have on regime type. Data is available from 1995 to 2008. The
regression model is:
Regimei,t = al + b l (Oili,t-s) + b2(Mineralsi,t_s) + b3(Loglncomei.t-s) + b4(Islami) +
bs(Regimei,t-s) + b6(SWFi.t-s) + b7 (Political TransparencYi,t_s) +
B 8(Political Stabilityi.t_s) + b9 (Foreign Direct Investment,t_s)
I first ran the model with the following independent variables: Oil, Minerals, Log

Income, Islam, Regime, Political Transparency, Political Stability, and Foreign Direct
Investment. SPSS was able to use data on all 40 resource-reliant states for the years 1995
to 2008. The results can be found in Table 5.6 on the next page. The regression offered
several interesting results. Notably, the only three variables that were statistically
significant were Islam and Lag Regime. Even the variable Oil drops its statistical
significance after controlling for Political Transparency. This suggests that at least some
of the antidemocratic effects of the oil resource curse occur as a result of decreased
government transparency. I would argue that these results confirm the claim that
sovereign wealth funds promote democratization by elevating political transparency;
however, the Political Transparency variable was not statistically significant. Therefore,
it appears that the central claim of this study has yet to be confirmed. The initial
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regression model does not indicate that sovereign wealth funds produce less authoritarian
regimes.

Table 5.6 Political Transparency Regression I
n=40
Coefficient
Oil
0.026
Minerals
0.020
Islam
-3.100
Log Income
-0.749
Lag Regime
0.902
Political Transparency
0.306
Political Stability
0.641
Foreign Direct Investment
0.077
Source: SPSS Multivariate Regression Analysis

Standard Error
0.027
0.041
0.994
1.008
0.086
0.349
0.352
0.056

Sig.
0.351
0.624
0.004
0.463
0.000
0.389
0.079
0.179

I reran the model including the variable Sovereign Wealth Fund. The results can
be found in Table 5.7 on the next page. The findings produce by the second political
transparency regression did not change the results of the previous model. Islam and Lag
Regime remained the only statistically significant variables. The Oil and Minerals
variables both decrease in statistical significance, suggesting that sovereign wealth funds
mitigate the antidemocratic effects of the resource curse. Since both variables were not
statistically significant in either regression model, we still cannot reject the null
hypothesis that sovereign wealth funds have no effect on regime type.
An interesting observation is that the variables Political Transparency and
Political Stability both decrease in coefficient size and statistical significance after
controlling for the presence of sovereign wealth funds. This implies that sovereign
wealth funds are correlated with both, while the Political Transparency finding confirms
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the difference in means test results. 56 Since neither Political Transparency nor Political
Stability were statistically significant, though, these results still disprove the central

premise of the study that sovereign wealth funds produce less authoritarian regimes.

Table 5.7 Political Transparency Regression II
Coefficient
n=40
0.022
Oil
0.024
Minerals
-3.228
Islam
-0.686
Log Income
Lag Regime
0.897
Sovereign Wealth Fund
0.393
0.279
Political Transparency
Political Stability
0.625
Foreign Direct Investment
0.077
Source: SPSS Multivariate Regression Analysis

Standard Error
0.029
0.042
1.067
1.038
0.088
1.076
0.362
0.358
0.057

Sig.
0.465
0.581
0.005
0.514
0.000
0.717
0.448
0.082
0.191

To confirm these results, I reran the test one more time adding the regional effect
variables. The results can be found in Table 5.8 on the next page. 57 Islam and Lag
Regime remained the only two statistically significant variables. The p-value for the
Sovereign Wealth Fund variable declines after controlling for the regional effects,

probably due to its high correlation with the Middle East. The third regression analysis
fails to reject the null hypothesis that sovereign wealth funds affect regime type through
either occupational specialization or by increasing political transparency.

Further research needs to be done to determine the causality between sovereign wealth
and political stability. The results only confirmed the assumption that the two were
related.
57 The variable Latin America was not included in this regression, because the sample did
not contain any Latin American states.
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Table 5.S Political Transparency Regression III

n=40
Coefficient
Oil
0.031
Minerals
0.028
Islam
-3.120
Log Income
-1.061
Lag Regime
0.897
Sovereign Wealth Fund
0.117
Political Transparency
0.399
Political Stability
0.630
Foreign Direct Investment
0.078
Middle East
0.910
Sub-Saharan
-0.030
Arabian Peninsula
-1.696
Small States
-1.308
Source: SPSS Multivariate Regression Analysis

Standard Error
0.035
0.045
1.442
1.184
0.094
1.185
0.488
0.393
0.064
1.584
1.066
1.779
1.369

Sig.
0.382
0.537
0.040
0.378
0.000
0.922
0.422
0.122
0.231
0.570
0.977
0.349
0.349

OVERVIEW
This study did not confirm all of my original hypotheses; however, it did produce
several substantive results. First, my analysis suggests that sovereign wealth funds
promote occupational specialization, but only within the service sector. I also discovered
that occupational specialization no longer affects regime type. Thus, increased
occupational specialization beget by sovereign wealth funds cannot mitigate the
antidemocratic effects of the resource curse. On a side-note, the models also call into
question the mineral resource curse. The coefficient on the variable Minerals was
positive and lacked statistical significance in all six regression models. Concerning the
second claim, it appears that sovereign wealth funds increase political transparency, but
political transparency does not affect regime type for resource-reliant states.
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CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION
This study surveyed the affects sovereign wealth funds exert on the state's
domestic economy and political formation. Chapter two introduced the resource curse
literature that laid the theoretical foundation for my claim that sovereign wealth funds
mitigate the antidemocratic effects of the resource curse. In chapter three, I defined the
term sovereign wealth fund and proffered the argument that these funds promote
occupational specialization and political transparency necessary for democratization. As
a result, I hypothesized that resource-reliant states with these funds would have less
authoritarian regimes than counterpart states. Using data available from the Polity IV
project, Freedom House Index, World Bank, UNESCO, International Labour
Organization, International Monetary Fund, and World Christian Encyclopedia presented
in chapter four, I explored the validity of the premises central to my argument and the
resource curse literature in general.
In chapter five, I further tested these hypotheses using difference in means tests
and a regime-estimation ARIMA model. The central premise of the study was not
confirmed. Sovereign wealth funds do not produce less authoritarian regimes. The
comparison of means test lent credence to the claim that these funds generate
occupational specialization within the state's service sector; however, the regimeestimation model contradicts previous claims that elevating occupational specialization
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encourages democratization. 58 I must therefore conclude that sovereign wealth funds
cannot foster democratization by increasing occupational specialization.
Tentative support exists for the second claim that sovereign wealth funds abet
political transparency. The difference in means test suggests that sovereign wealth funds
encourage political transparency. The regime-estimation model failed to reject the null
hypothesis that elevated levels of political transparency affect regime type in resourcereliant states. These results mirror those of the occupational specialization claim:
sovereign wealth funds promote political transparency, but a more open government does
not yield democratization in resource-reliant states. I must also caution that the data
available merely allowed me to test the affect the presence of sovereign wealth funds had
on political transparency. The exact nature of this relationship provided in the theory
section was not confirmed and remains a theoretical speculation about the relationship
between political transparency and sovereign wealth funds.

METHODOLOGICAL SHORTFALLS
Missing data was the major problem that plagued my research. The lack of
annual data for occupational specialization and absent information about the internal
structures and operations of sovereign wealth funds were an issue that hindered the

58 Ross recently reached the same conclusion in a soon to be released article titled Oil and
Democracy Revisited. In the paper, Ross concludes that the rentier effect is the only
causal mechanism of the resource curse. The article has not been published yet; however,
advance copies of it are available from several recent conferences and presentations. The
paper was presented at the following conferences: the Rand Institute's International
Development Speakers Series, University of California's International Relations Speaker
Series, Georgetown University Government Department's speaker series, the University
of Pennsylvania's Political Science speaker series, and Yale University's Leitner
Seminar.
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results of this study. The World Bank and International Labour Organization compile
occupational specialization data from information found in state census forms and
national educational surveys. Since censuses are not typically performed annually, these
organizations consult educational surveys to provide annual data points for the years in
between census. The problem with this method is that annual education surveys are not
typically available for developing states prior to the 1990s and for many less developed
states until the last decade. That creates a problem for resource curse research. Using
pooled time series cross-sectional data help alleviate this problem; however, an ideal
study would still include more annual data points to better measure the effect of
sovereign wealth funds over time.
Another general problem inherently associated with studying sovereign wealth
funds is the opaque nature of fund operations. Without knowing the exact amount of
capital available, investment strategies, and fund structure, researchers can only make
general observations of sovereign wealth funds and the effect these funds expend on
global financial markets and domestic economies. More precisely, this study could only
focus on how the presence of sovereign wealth funds affected occupational specialization
and political transparency. The missing data thus became a limiting factor in my
statistical analysis in that the true size of the democratizing effect of sovereign wealth
funds cannot be determined.
Finally, using the OLS linear regression analysis with panel-corrected standard
errors and lagged variables created by Nathaniel Beck and Jonathan Katz may appear
parsimonious to more established political methodologists; however, my belief is that this
methodology should adequately serve the statistical needs of this thesis and produce
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efficient and reliable estimates. The Beck and Katz method has gained wide-spread
acceptance among econometricians over the past decade. Although, I will admit that a
more sophisticated approaches such as the feasible generalized least squares regression
used by Michael Ross or Kmenta's "cross-sectionally heteroskedastic and timewise
autocorrelated" (CRT A) model remain more widely accepted than OLS regression
analysis with panel-corrected standard errors among political methodologists (Kmenta,
1986; Beck and Katz, 1996; Ross, 2001).59

SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE STUDIES
I plan to revisit this study in several years, because missing information on the
operations and size of sovereign wealth funds will be made available in the near future.
Park Alpha, the creator of the Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute, recently announced the
upcoming release of the Sovereign Wealth Fund Transaction Database that includes a
complete list of financial transactions conducted by every sovereign wealth fund from
1986 to 2010. Access to that data will allow future researchers to estimate the annual
growth rate of capital appreciation experienced by individual sovereign wealth fund over
a twenty-five year time period. That data can be used to determine how much capital
actually flows out of these funds into the domestic economy of the states that create them,

59 Kmenta' s CRTA model uses generalized least squares to correct for panel
heteroskedasticity and serially correlated errors (Kmenta, 1986; Beck and Katz, 1996).
This method has remained popular among political scientists; however, it does not appear
to produce more accurate results than then the Beck and Katz method and requires a
much greater level of mathematical sophistication (Beck and Katz, 1996). CRTA also
proves less effective when contemporaneous correlation of errors is present in the model
(Beck and Katz, 1996).
88

which will allow me to measure the true effect of sovereign wealth fund reinvestments on
occupational specialization.
As I stated earlier, the lack of available data complicated my investigation of the
occupational specialization claim. Currently information only exists for years when
census or survey data is available. Surveys to collect this data have routinely been
conducted in developed states since the 1960s; however, routine surveys collecting this
data only emerged in the past decade for developing states. The limited information
available for these states in the pooled time-series cross-sectional dataset means
definitive claims about occupational specialization and sovereign wealth funds are more
difficult to make. Significantly more data will become available over the next decade as
nascent sovereign wealth funds mature and survey usage increases. Enough data should
be available in the next decade to include most of the state excluded in this study. Thus
future statistical analysis of these claims will be inherently more valid than this study.
Also, the political transparency argument will need to be revisited in the future to
account for any new laws and regulations that are likely to emerge. The European
Central Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF), United States Treasury Department,
and World Bank have all issued press releases calling for the creation of generally
accepted principles and practices (GAPP) for sovereign wealth funds in order to improve
the transparency of fund investment objectives and operations (Truman, 2007; IWG,
2008; Kalter and Holt, 2010; Truman, 2010). These actions lead to the formation of the
International Working Group (IWG) of Sovereign Wealth Funds at a meeting in
Washington D.C. that took place on April 30 to May 1,2008 (IWG 2008; Kalter and
Holt, 2010).
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It was determined at this meeting that Hamad Al HUff Al Suwaidi, the

Undersecretary of the Abu Dhabi Finance Department, and Jaime Caruana, the Director
of Monetary and Capital Markets Department at the IMF would co-chair a panel of
twenty-eight representatives charged with drafting a set of GAPP for sovereign wealth
funds (IWG, 2008; Kalter and Holt, 2010; Truman, 2010).60 The IWG has met three
times since then. The first meetings in Singapore and Oslo, Norway set the agenda for
the third meeting in Santiago, Chile where a rough draft of the group's GAPP plan was
finalized (IWG, 2008; Truman, 2010).
Currently the Santiago Principles, as the GAPP has been named, are circulating
among member states for comments and revisions (Truman, 2010). No deadline has been
set for the completion of this process; however, several comments from member states
have been publicly released. The Peterson Institute for International Economics recently
released an index that measures the level of adherence to the Santiago Principles
exhibited by various sovereign wealth funds (Truman, 2010). This scorecard showed
widespread adherence to the principles by nearly all member states, which suggests that
the Santiago Principles may officially enter the global financial structure in the near
future. Full scale implementation of the Santiago Principles by sovereign wealth fund
managers might promote greater levels of political transparency in the future than these
funds encouraged in the past.

60 The panel of twenty-eight members includes one representative each from twenty-three
different states with sovereign wealth funds and five permanent observers. The states
with sovereign wealth funds on the board are: Australia, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Botswana,
Canada, Chile, China, Equatorial Guinea, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Ireland, Korea,
Kuwait, Libya, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Qatar, Russia, Singapore, Timor-Leste,
Trinidad and Tobago, the United Arab Emirates, and the United States. The permanent
observers are: Oman, Saudi Arabia, Vietnam, the OECD, and the World Bank. Oman,
Saudi Arabia, and Vietnam all possess sovereign wealth funds.
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OVERVIEW OF THE STUDY
My thesis remained true to the form established by previous resource curse
scholars by raising nearly as many questions as it answered. Despite the unexpected
results of this study, it still contributed important insights into the micro level effects of
sovereign wealth funds. We learned that sovereign wealth funds foster occupational
specialization, albeit only in the service sector of the economy. The findings also suggest
that occupational specialization no longer appears to be a causal mechanism for the
resource curse, so any attempts to boost labor force participation should not be expected
to encourage democratization. Unrelated to the central purpose of this study, we also
discovered that the resource curse does not appear to exist for mineral wealth anymore.
The findings also offer tentative support for the claim that sovereign wealth funds induce
political transparency for resource-reliant states relative to counterpart states, but only if
the government was authoritarian when the fund was created.
Currently the limited sample size of sovereign wealth fund states before 1990
inhibits the creation of valid generalizable theory about sovereign wealth funds and
political transparency. In other words, my analysis can only confirm what happened in
the past and should not be used to speculate what will happen in the future. Release of
Park Alpha's Sovereign Wealth Fund Transaction Database will soon bring public the
data necessary to determine the true relationship between sovereign wealth funds and
political transparency. Gaining a fuller understanding of this relationship would allow
researchers to determine if there is something unique about the way certain sovereign
wealth funds are managed that leads to political transparency. This data may also
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provide key insights that will allow me to generalize between states, which the current
method does not.
Following the tradition established by Ross, I plan to revisit this study in another
decade. I believe this is necessary because three events will occur over the next decade
that could challenge these conclusions. First, recently created stabilization and public
pension plans should have enough time to mature by the year 2020 to test this claim for a
wider variety of stats. Of course, these funds might also disprove the generalizability of
my theory by proving that the promotion of political transparency was .limited to the
original states. Second, the passage of time will also allow me to test what affect the
original sovereign wealth funds have over two full oil price cycles. Finally, widespread
implementation of the Santiago Principles could promote political transparency via
sovereign wealth funds in a way that this thesis could not predict.
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Appendix A
List of Sovereign Wealth Funds A-S
Country

Sovereign Wealth Fund Name

Algeria

Revenue Regulation Fund

Australia

Australian Future Fund

Azerbaijan

State Oil Fund

Bahrain

Mumtalakat Holding Company

Botswana

Pula Fund

Brazil

Sovereign Fund of Brazil

Brunei

Brunei Investment Agency

Chile

Social and Economic Stabilization Fund

China

SAFE Investment Company

China

National Social Security Fund

China

China Investment Corporation

China

China-Africa Development Fund

China (Hong Kong)

Hong Kong Monetary Authority Investment Portfolio

East Timor

Timor-Leste Petroleum Fund

France

Strategic Investment Fund

Indonesia

Government Investment Unit

Iran

Oil Stabilisation Fund

Ireland

National Pensions Reserve Fund

Kazakhstan

Kazakhstan National Fund

Kiribati

Revenue Equalization Reserve Fund

Kuwait

Kuwait I nvestment Authority

Libya

Libyan Investment Authority

Malaysia

Khazanah Nasional

Mauritania

National Fund for Hydrocarbon Reserves

New Zealand

New Zealand Superannuation Fund

Nigeria

Excess Crude Account

Norway

Government Pension Fund - Global

Oman

State General Reserve Fund

Oman

Oman Investment Fund

Qatar

Qatar Investment Authority

Russia

National Welfare Fund

Saudi Arabia

Public Investment Fund

Saudi Arabia

SAMA Foreign Holdings

Singapore

Temasek Holdings

Singapore

Government of Singapore Investment Corporation

South Korea

Korea Investment Corporation
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Appendix A
List of Sovereign Wealth Funds T -V
Country

Sovereign Wealth Fund Name

Trinidad & Tobago

Heritage and Stabilization Fund

UAE (Abu Dhabi)

Abu Dhabi Investment Authority

UAE (Abu Dhabi)

International Petroleum Investment Company

UAE (Abu Dhabi)

Mubadala Development Company

UAE (Abu Dhabi)

Abu Dhabi Investment Council

UAE (Dubai)

Investment Corporation of Dubai

UAE (Federal)

Emirates Investment Authority

UAE (Ras AI Khaimah)

RAK Investment Authority

Venezuela

FEM

Vietnam

State Capital Investment Corporation

Source: Sovereign Wealth Institute
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Appendix B
Data for Sovereign Wealth Fund Dummy Variable
Country

Sovereign Wealth Fund Name

Algeria

Revenue Regulation Fund

Australia

Australian Future Fund

Azerbaijan

State Oil Fund

Bahrain

Mumtalakat Holding Company

Botswana

Pula Fund

Brazil

Sovereign Fund of Brazil

Brunei

Brunei Investment Agency

Chile

Social and Economic Stabilization Fund

China

SAFE Investment Company

East Timor

Timor-Leste Petroleum Fund

France

Strategic Investment Fund

Indonesia

Government Investment Unit

Iran

Oil Stabilisation Fund

Ireland

National Pensions Reserve Fund

Kazakhstan

Kazakhstan National Fund

Kiribati

Revenue Equalization Reserve Fund

Kuwait

Kuwait Investment Authority

Libya

Libyan Investment Authority

Malaysia

Khazanah Nasional

Mauritania

National Fund for Hydrocarbon Reserves

New Zealand

New Zealand Superannuation Fund

Nigeria

Excess Crude Account

Norway

Government Pension Fund - Global

Oman

State General Reserve Fund

Qatar

Qatar Investment Authority

Russia

National Welfare Fund

Saudi Arabia

Public Investment Fund

Singapore

Govt. of Singapore Investment Corporation

South Korea

Korea Investment Corporation

Trinidad & Tobago

Heritage and Stabilization Fund

UAE

Abu Dhabi Investment Authority

Venezuela

FEM

Vietnam

Stat~ Capital Investment Corporation

Source: Sovereign Wealth Institute
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Inception

2000
2004
1999
2006
1994
2009
1983
1985
1997
2005
2008
2006
1999
2001
2000
1956
1953
2006
1993
2006
2003
2004
1990
1980
2005
2008
2008
1981
2005
2000
1976
1998
2006

----------------------------------------

Appendix C
Industrial Activity Used to Create
Men in Industry and Women in Industry Variables
ISIC,
revision 4

ISCE 1958

ISCE 1993

Mining and Quarrying

Category B

Catgeory 2

Category C

Manufacturing

Category C

Catgeory 3

Category 0

Electricity, gas, steam, and air conditioning

Category 0

Catgeory 4

Category E

Water supply including sewerage, waste
management, and remediation services

Category E

Catgeory 4

Category E

Construction

Category F

Catgeory 5

Category F

Industrial Activity

Source: International Labour Organization and World Bank
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AppendixD
Service Sector Activity Used to Create
Men in Services and Women in Services Variables
Service Sector Activity

ISIC, rev 4

Wholesale and retail trade including repair of motor vehicles

Category G

Transportation and storage

Category H

Accommodation and food service activities

Category I

Information and communication

Category J

Financial and insurance activities

Category K

Real estate activities

Category L

Professional, scientific, and technical activities

Category M

Administrative and support service activities

Category N

Public admin. and defense including compulsory social security

Category 0

Education

Category P

Human health and social work activities

Category Q

Arts, entertainment, and recreation and other service activities

Category R

Other service activities

Category S

Household act. and production of undifferentiated goods/services

CategoryT

Service Sector Activity

ISCE 1993

Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles, motor sales

Category G

Hotels and restaurants

Category H

Transport, storage and communications

Category I

Financial intermediation

Category J

Real estate, renting and business activities

Category K

Public administration and defence; compulsory social security

Category L

Education

Category M

Health and social work

Category N

Other community, social and personal service activities

Category 0

Households with employed persons

Category P

Service Sector Activity

ISCE 1958

Commerce

Category 6

Transport, storage, and communication

Category 7

Services

Category 8

Source: International Labour Organization and World Bank
107

Appendix E
Oil-Reliant States: 1992 to 2008
Notes

State
Algeria
Angola
Azerbaijan

Oil and Mineral Reliant

Bahrain
Belarus
Bhutan
Brunei Darussalam
Cameroon
Congo, Republic of
Cote d'ivoire
Gabon
Indonesia
Iraq
Islamic Republic of Iran
Kazakhstan

Oil and Mineral Reliant

Kuwait
Krygyz Republic
Libya
Malaysia
Nigeria
Oman
Papua New Guinea

Oil and Mineral Reliant

Qatar
Russian Federation
Saudi Arabia
Syrian Arab Republic
Tajikistan

Oil and Mineral Reliant

Turkmenistan
United Arab Emirates

Oil and Mineral Reliant

Vietnam
Yemen, Republic of
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Appendix F
Mineral-Reliant States: 1992 to 2008
Notes

State

Oil and Mineral Reliant

Bahrain
Guinea
Guyana
Jordan
Kazakhstan

Oil and Mineral Reliant

Mauritania
Mongolia
Niger
Oil and Mineral Reliant

Papua New Guinea
Suriname

Oil and Mineral Reliant

Tajikistan
Togo

Oil and Mineral Reliant

United Arab Emirates
Zambia
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Appendix G
Oil-Reliant States: 1970 to 2008
Notes

State
Algeria
Angola

Data Missing

Azerbaijan
Bahrain

Oil and Mineral Reliant

Belarus

Data Missing

Bhutan
Brunei Darussalam
Cameroon
Congo, Republic of
Ecuador
Gabon

Oil and Mineral Reliant

Indonesia
Iraq
Islamic Republic of Iran
Oil and Mineral Reliant

Kazakhstan
Kuwait
Krygyz Republic
Libya
Malaysia
Nigeria
Oman
Qatar
Russian Federation
Saudi Arabia
Syrian Arab Republic
Tajikistan

Oil and Mineral Reliant

Tunisia
Turkmenistan

Data Missing

United Arab Emirates

Oil and Mineral Reliant

Venezuela, Bolivarian Republic of
Vietnam
Yemen, Republic of
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Appendix H
Mineral-Reliant States: 1970 to 2008
State

Notes

Bahrain

Oil and Mineral Reliant

Bolivia
Chile
Congo, Democratic Republic of
Gabon

Oil and Mineral Reliant

Guinea
Guyana
Kazakhstan

Oil and Mineral Reliant

Liberia
Mauritania

Data Missing

Mongolia
Niger
Papua New Guinea

Data Missing

Peru
Tajikistan

Oil and Mineral Reliant

Togo

Data Missing

United Arab Emirates

Oil and Mineral Reliant

Zambia
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